A Partnership of Convenience: Russia, Iran, and the Limits of Opportunism

In recent years, increasing attention has been dedicated to understanding and countering the growing convergence of the Axis of Autocracies—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—which seek to undermine the U.S.-led international order. Russia and Iran’s accelerating partnership is of particular interest, given their historically fraught relationship. 

Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow and Tehran have expanded cooperation across military and diplomatic channels. However, there are limits to their partnership, which remains constrained by mutual mistrust, diverging regional interests, unavoidable competition, and asymmetric dependencies. More than anything, however, the bilateral partnership has little chance of graduating into a full-fledged, genuine alliance while it remains driven by opportunism and hedging—where Moscow treats Tehran as a junior partner and a means to an end rather than an ally. 

Current events have further clarified the limits of Moscow and Tehran’s partnership. Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion are a live stress test of Russia and Iran’s partnership, and it seems to be faltering. Until the April 8 ceasefire, Iran faced sustained U.S. and Israeli military pressure for more than a month. Moscow’s response was one of calculated restraint, primarily confined to diplomatic condemnation and calls for de-escalation rather than material aid. This suggests that Moscow is both unable and unwilling to help its partner, despite a strategic partnership treaty signed between the two countries little more than a year ago and Tehran’s notable military support to Russia in its war against Ukraine. 

Now the Islamic Republic of Iran faces an uncertain future. As of this writing, the Iranian regime remains intact, though through no help of Moscow’s. Absent a black swan event, the regime is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future, but its relationship with Russia has been exposed as weak and limited. This outcome is not surprising as Moscow has routinely proved itself an opportunistic partner, willing to engage on a quid pro quo basis but unwilling to elevate Iran to a true partnership status.  

From Historic Rivals to Cautious Cooperation: Russia-Iran Relations from 1900—Present

Russia and Iran’s relationship has historically been driven by mistrust and rivalry. Among the early flashpoints were two successive military confrontations in the nineteenth century—fought between 1804 and 1813, and again from 1826 to 1828—in which both powers clashed over competing ambitions in the Caucasus.¹ 

By the early 1900s, the Russian empire had come to regard Iran as a subordinate territory ripe for exploitation.² Hoping to shore up its diminishing foothold in the region, Russia struck a deal with Britain in 1907 that carved Iran into spheres of influence. This imperial logic persisted over the following years as Russian policymakers formally embraced a strategy of colonizing Iran’s northern territories around 1912. By World War I, Russian troops had occupied the Azerbaijani province of Qajar Iran, which persisted until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought the imperial project to an abrupt end.³

Attempting to reset relations post-Revolution, in 1921 Iran and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, leading to the formation of the “Iran-Soviet Joint Company, which led to joint ventures across multiple sectors.”⁴ Despite the global economic challenges of the 1920’s, the Soviet Union became Iran’s top trading partner.⁵ Reza Shah also came to power during this time and established Iran’s Pahlavi dynasty. His reign in the interwar period focused on modernizing and centralizing Iran, including reforms that were often at odds with Britain’s aspirations and economic interests in the country. Though he “sought to balance between the British and Soviet colonial powers and achieve peaceful coexistence,” Reza Shah also wanted to establish Iran’s independence.⁶

Early on in Reza Shah’s reign, Communist movements began to grow in Iran. Deeply mistrustful of communism, Reza Shah viewed these movements as linked to the Soviet Union, and he cracked down hard and fast to attempt to contain their spread.⁷ As the world found itself on the brink of a second world war, the Shah began to subtly align himself with Germany—where he had found a strong economic partner—though Iran declared neutrality at the war’s onset.⁸ 

Iran’s strategic position and increasing alignment with Germany led the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to jointly invade and occupy it in 1941. Operation Countenance aimed to limit German influence, secure Iranian oil fields, and shore up Allied supply lines as the Soviets fought Germany on the Eastern front.⁹ Reza Shah was deposed and succeeded by his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The Soviets remained in Iran for nearly five years, during which time they expanded their influence by supporting separatist movements in the country. While Allies committed at the Tehran Conference of 1943 to upholding Iran’s sovereignty and withdrawing troops from occupied territories, the Soviet Union maintained a presence in Iran through May 1946.¹⁰ To this day, the Soviet occupation of Iran “still evokes painful memories in Tehran.”¹¹

1946 –1979: Cold War Rivals 

The start of the Cold War brought the United States more actively into Iran’s political arena as it sought to counter Soviet influence in the region. With the Shah leading Iran, the United States had a valuable, dependable, anti-communist ally in a critical region of the world.¹² The Shah’s deep-rooted anti-Communism made him one of the few Third World leaders who supported U.S. policies in Vietnam and other Cold War hotspots.¹³ With Iran’s recent history of Soviet occupation and invasion, the Shah was also deeply mistrustful of the Soviets and at times held a near obsession toward what he perceived as the Soviet threat. 

While Moscow and Tehran’s relationship during this period was most accurately characterized as a rivalry, there were points where the Shah, doubtful of U.S. commitment to the survival of his regime, tried to pursue a more pragmatic relationship with the Soviets. On February 12, 1959, The New York Times broke the story that a secret Soviet delegation had arrived in Tehran to negotiate a non-aggression pact, which ultimately failed. Iran historian and author of Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War Dr. Roham Alvandi writes that it was the Shah’s “first tentative step towards a more independent posture in the global Cold War.”¹⁴ Later during the 1960s and 1970s, bilateral trade between Iran and the Soviet Union expanded, including Iran’s purchase of Soviet-made weapons.¹⁵  

1979–2010s: Patron-Client Dynamic

The 1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent rise of Ayatollah Khomeini led U.S.-Iranian relations to become quickly and openly antagonistic as Tehran reversed its pro-Washington alignment. Tehran’s new anti-Western position and the Soviet Union’s quick recognition of the Islamic Republic of Iran only marginally improved relations between the two, however.¹⁶

Soviet relations with Iran remained tense during the 1980–1988 eight-year Iran-Iraq war, which was deeply traumatizing for the Iranians. Moscow—which initially warned Iran against entering the war—began a significant campaign in 1982 to recalibrate relations with Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, emphasizing closer military ties through weapons transfers.¹⁷ That year, Soviet airborne arms deliveries to Iraq tripled, while “Soviet-Iranian relations steadily deteriorated to their lowest levels since the Shah’s reign.”¹⁸ Following several early Iranian battlefield wins, and increasing fear that an Iranian victory would allow Khomeini to spread Islamic fundamentalism closer to the Soviet Union’s border, Moscow abandoned its more balanced approach toward the war and lifted the arms embargo it had instituted against both countries. This decision was a major tactical shift favoring Iraq, which bought more weapons from the Soviets than Iran did. Moscow’s decision to turn towards Baghdad was motivated in part because of its “frustrations with the Khomeini regime’s failure to respond to its continual overtures for closer relations and with Tehran’s recurrent anti-Soviet gestures.”¹⁹ 

At this point in the conflict, declassified CIA documents indicate that Moscow was seriously weighing the risk of deteriorating relations with Iran against an Iranian victory.²⁰ To Russia, an Iranian victory would have risked strengthening the Khomeini regime and spreading its religious fanaticism while undermining Soviet influence in Iraq, which could have turned towards the West for assistance. Moscow ultimately decided that an Iranian victory was less tenable for its own interests in the region. The Soviets also calculated correctly that Iran’s anti-Western sentiment was enduring and that Iran “would remain hostile towards the United States for a long time,” and as such, a tilt towards Iraq would not trigger an Iranian pivot towards the West.²¹ 

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a cautious and gradual rapprochement between Russia and Iran, and the beginning of what some analysts have characterized as Russia and Iran’s “strategic partnership.”²² In 2007, Moscow invited Iran to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO)—a post-Soviet mutual security pact between Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan—though Iran did not end up joining. By the mid-2000s, Iran was Russia’s seventh-largest trading partner, and the two countries signed several economic agreements focused on agriculture, telecommunications, and energy. Russia, hoping to sell its Soviet-era military systems, began transferring MiG-29 fighters, Su-24 strike aircraft, diesel submarines, tanks, S-200 air defense systems, and, later, the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system to Iran in the 1990s.²³ Though these transfers were important to Iran, Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center Alexander Gabuev and his co-authors argue in a March 2026 Foreign Affairs articlethat they never “constituted alliance-level military integration,” as Russian arms deliveries “remained episodic and constrained by Western sanctions.”²⁴

2010s–2022: A Rocky Road in Syria 

The early 2010s brought Syria into the foreground of the Russia-Iran axis, exposing different fissures in their relationship. While some analysts have pointed to the Syrian civil war as the point of emergence of a strong regional alliance between Moscow and Tehran, in reality, their cooperation followed a quid pro quo pattern—situational, where it suited both, and ultimately based on convenience.²⁵

As anti-regime protests intensified in Syria in 2011 and the country hurtled toward civil war, both Moscow and Tehran moved quickly to shore up Bashar al-Assad’s government. Moscow and Tehran cooperated militarily to both suppress the Syrian opposition and combat the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Tehran, in particular, was instrumental in propping up Assad, offering “unwavering and constant support on multiple fronts,” including “substantial quantities of oil, averaging two million barrels a month in 2013–18, with deferred payment,” as well as weapons to the Syrian army and troops from the IRGC and Iran’s proxy militias.²⁶ 

Russia’s early presence was more restrained but strategically consequential. Putin recognized an opportunity to reassert Moscow’s relevance in the Middle East following years of post-Soviet retrenchment and offered Assad critical diplomatic cover and military assistance from the outset.²⁷ 

The diplomatic groundwork for deeper bilateral coordination was laid through a series of high-level exchanges in late 2014 and early 2015. Ayatollah Khamenei’s foreign policy adviser traveled to Moscow to meet with President Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, carrying a personal letter from Khamenei. The visit was intended to explore the prospect of expanded military assistance to Syria, including the possibility of direct Russian intervention. These talks were preceded by bilateral agreements on military-technical cooperation, and Shoigu visited Tehran, the first Russian defense minister to do so in fifteen years.²⁸ Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani also sought audiences in Moscow in early 2015 to press for Russian intervention, eventually meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov.²⁹

In September 2015, with the Assad regime on the brink of collapse, Russia launched a decisive military intervention, providing the critical air support to Assad’s forces that Iranian-backed ground forces lacked. The intervention expanded Assad’s territorial control, and parallel diplomatic efforts effectively stabilized the regime. In August 2016, Iran permitted Russian aircraft to conduct strikes into Syria from the Shahid Nojeh Air Base, marking a new high point in the bilateral partnership.³⁰ 

Yet beneath this surface-level unity, the partnership was riddled with friction. Tensions over battlefield coordination materialized early, as Iranian commanders expressed frustration over what they perceived as insufficient Russian air support.³¹ The siege of Khan Touman in 2016 brought those tensions into sharp relief when Iran suffered significant IRGC and proxy casualties in the battle, one of its heaviest single losses of the war. Iranian media outlets affiliated with senior IRGC figures openly attacked Russia’s perceived indifference toward those losses, contrasting Moscow’s military inaction with the spectacle of a symphony it staged in the ruins of Palmyra.³² 

Disagreements extended into the economic sphere as well, with Moscow and Tehran competing for reconstruction contracts across the energy, phosphate, agriculture, and real estate sectors. At times, Russia secured oil, gas, and phosphate deals at the direct expense of Iranian commercial interests. Iran also sought advanced Russian weaponry, including Su-35 fighter jets, but Moscow repeatedly delayed finalizing any arms transfer.³³ 

Russia and Iran both held competing visions over military priorities and the shape of post-war Syria as well. Iran expert Michael Eisenstadt accurately outlined the complex puzzle in 2015: 

The recent Russian intervention may complicate matters for Iran, however. If Tehran had gone all-in with more ground forces earlier in the war, the Assad regime might not have needed Moscow’s help. Instead, Iran is no longer Syria’s sole patron—it is waging coalition warfare now, and Russia will have a major say in how the conflict is prosecuted.³⁴

Russia sought a unified, professionalized Syrian army capable of sustaining a stable central government that would protect its military bases and regional strategic interests. Iran, by contrast, was less invested in state-building and more focused on embedding itself in Syria, which it viewed as a crucial ally to help project regional influence and counter Israel. 

2022–Present: Friends with Mutual Benefits

Prior to 2022, Russia mainly provided an irregular flow of military assistance into Iran, largely focused on Soviet-era hardware systems instead of technology transfers. After 2022, Russia and Iran’s defense relationship expanded significantly, moving past its prior “patron-client dynamic” into a more balanced partnership, with Iran emerging as a “key enabler of Russia’s air and ground defense in Ukraine.”³⁵ Since 2021, Russia has invested at least $4 billion USD in Iranian military equipment, while Iran has provided Russia with drones, drone production technology, and drone training, as well as artillery shells, small arms ammunition, anti-tank rockets, mortar bombs, and glide bombs.³⁶ Iran’s delivery of Shahed-136 drones in particular has been of crucial importance to Russia’s war effort. Earlier this year, reports indicated that Iran had sent $2.7 billion USD worth of missiles alone to aid Russia’s war effort.³⁷ 

As Moscow became more dependent on Iran’s hardware, Tehran in return received several Russian Yak-130 trainer jets, Spartak armored vehicles, small arms, and, most recently. attack helicopters, which allowed it to modernize its own armed forces.³⁸ Contracts have also reportedly been signed for Russia to supply Iran with up to fifty Su-35 fighter jets and 500 Verba man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).³⁹ 

Diplomatic engagements between the two countries also increased in frequency, as Erika Holmquist and Ismail Khan—both analysts at the Swedish Defence Research Agency—note: 

President Vladimir Putin’s trip to Tehran in July 2022 was his first outside of the post-Soviet area since the beginning of the war against Ukraine. Putin and Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, also met on three other occasions in 2022, in both bilateral and multilateral settings. On the ministerial level, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian met five times and held nine telephone conversations in 2022. The Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, travelled to Tehran on 8 November 2022, at the invitation of his Iranian counterpart, Ali Shamkhani, just a few days after Iran had officially confirmed that it had transferred drones to Russia.⁴⁰

Structural Constraints on the Russia-Iran Partnership

While Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has unquestionably fueled deeper cooperation between Russia and Iran, the depths of this new ‘strategic partnership’ should not be over-indexed. In 2022, then CIA Director William Burns remarked on the expanding Russia-Iran relationship:“The reality is that Russians and Iranians need each other right now…Both federally sanctioned countries, both looking to break out of political isolation as well—but if they need each other, they don’t really trust each other, in the sense that they’re energy rivals and historical competitors.”⁴¹

Mr. Burns was correct. Despite their expanded cooperation since 2022, Moscow and Tehran’s partnership faces three significant structural constraints that prevent it from becoming a full-fledged alliance. 

Moscow’s Delicate Balancing Act 

Russia and Iran’s relationship is marked by a deep-rooted, persistent mistrust stemming as far back as the Soviet occupation of Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. While Russia and Iran may presently be united by their “long-term confrontation with the West,” Iran has a long memory and, given its history, will likely maintain a deep skepticism towards Russia, viewing it as an opportunistic and unreliable partner.⁴² 

This skepticism is heightened by the fact that Moscow and Tehran ultimately have diverging desires—Iran’s opposition to the West is fundamentally “rooted in ideological hostility, driven by its revolutionary outlook” and the desire for regional influence, while Russia aims to counterbalance U.S. superpower status and craft a multipolar world where it is a major global player. This means that Russia is engaged in strategic hedging, often acting pragmatically in its relationships with other countries, even at the expense of Iran’s interests. 

The desire to act pragmatically has been most obvious in the Middle East, where Moscow wants to preserve its strategic position. It cannot afford to antagonize Iran’s rival, Israel, which has previously aligned with Moscow’s interests in Syria. Moscow also maintains positive, if not transactional, relationships with the Gulf states, whose energy markets promise more than Iran’s. Conversely, Israel and the Gulf States have a limited “tolerance for Russian enhancement of Iran’s capabilities,” meaning that Russia must continually weigh its relationship with Iran against its broader strategic goals in the region.⁴³ 

Gabuev, Grajewski, and Vakulenko highlight Moscow’s pragmatic approach to its relationships during the Syria conflict: “Moscow maintained parallel security relationships with Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf states—all competitors or adversaries to Iran. Iranian officials were not blind to this, and the resentment it generated ran deep.”⁴⁴

Tehran’s Junior Partner Status

Moscow also treats Tehran as a junior partner. In early 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty aimed at strengthening bilateral relations over the next twenty years. The wide-ranging agreement expanded several areas of bilateral cooperation, with joint ventures in oil, gas, and nuclear energy, transport, regional affairs, and defense, and included a clause committing both countries to “counter the application of unilateral coercive measures.”⁴⁵ 

However, the treaty did not formalize any concrete deliverables by way of new investments or large-scale infrastructure projects between the two countries. It also did not impose new security assistance obligations on Iran or Russia. After the treaty’s ratification, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko notably clarified that “the signing of the treaty does not mean the establishment of a military alliance with Iran or mutual military assistance” in the event of an attack on Iran.⁴⁶ This suggests that Russia and Iran’s partnership remains primarily rhetorical—the two countries have not moved beyond gray zone coordination and defense trade into the next phase of economic partnership, nor has either side committed to the other’s defense. 

Growing Asymmetries 

Finally, the Russia-Iran relationship is increasingly asymmetric. Early in the Ukraine war, Russia benefited significantly from Iran’s ability to produce drones at scale, launching Iran-produced Shahed-136 drones at Ukraine daily. Later, Iran began transferring Shahed-136 drone technology to Russia, enabling Moscow to build its own domestic drone industry under the name Geran-2. As a result, Russia’s reliance on Iran’s defense sector has notably waned, as Moscow has expanded its local production of Shahed drones and diversified its sourcing of UAV components.⁴⁷ Russia’s drone production line in Tatarstan, which Iran helped build, now operates largely without Iranian involvement, and the latest drone models recovered in Ukraine appear to operate with Chinese rather than Iranian engines.⁴⁸ These developments mean that Iran has lost a significant point of leverage it previously held with Moscow, and that, in the future, Tehran may be more dependent on Moscow than Moscow is on Tehran.

The two countries are also energy rivals, a tension the conflict in Iran has thrown into sharp relief. Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz removed roughly a fifth of global oil supply from the market and produced what the International Energy Agency called the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, sending Brent crude above $100 a barrel.⁴⁹ In the short-term, Moscow has benefited from these disruptions. Rising energy prices and the U.S. decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian oil in transit have provided Moscow with significant fiscal wiggle room—a revenue boost of approximately $150 million per day—which it can use to address its growing budget deficit and to finance operations against Ukraine.⁵⁰ Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have also limited the ability of Gulf states to export their oil, thereby strengthening Russia’s position as an energy supplier to China and India. Washington’s emergency waiver allowing India to keep buying stranded Russian cargoes helped both China and India absorb record volumes of Russian crude during the crisis.⁵¹

Yet this windfall has only served to illustrate the rivalry between the two. Moscow’s advantage was always likely to prove short-lived. The gradual, albeit slow, reopening of the Strait under the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has begun returning Iranian barrels to the same Asian markets Moscow had been supplying. By late June 2026, Russia was reportedly already facing stiffer competition for Indian buyers as the U.S. sanctions waiver freed up rival Iranian cargoes—a reminder that Moscow and Tehran ultimately compete for the same customer pool, and what benefits one as an energy exporter often comes at the other’s expense.⁵²

A Low Ceiling: Moscow as an Unable and Unwilling Partner 

The current conflict in Iran prompts a reevaluation of the Russia-Iran relationship, which has been one of the most enduring and important dynamics in the Middle East. At present, the relationship seems to have reached its ceiling. As the Iranian regime faced an existential threat, support from Russia was overwhelmingly rhetorical. Russia’s foreign ministry condemned the war as “unprovoked acts of armed aggression” against Iran, and called for “immediate de-escalation, cessation of hostilities, and a resumption of political and diplomatic processes.⁵³ When Ayatollah Khamenei’s death was confirmed, Putin expressed his condolences and passively described the assassination as “committed in cynical violation of the norms of human morality and international law.”⁵⁴ 

Beyond diplomatic condemnation, Moscow has reportedly provided Tehran with intelligence sharing to help target U.S. forces in the region, but this was limited assistance and did not prove to materially change Iran’s position in the war. There is no evidence that Russia is willing to supply Iran with advanced fighters, air defense systems, and precise munitions, which it needs for its own operations in Ukraine. 

President Trump’s attempts to wrap up the conflict in Iran have also distracted the West from Russia’s war in Ukraine and diverted critical U.S. interceptors and munitions that could have aided Ukraine’s defense. This is beneficial for Moscow, which is also likely looking to strengthen its position in any potential future negotiations with the United States on ending the war in Ukraine.⁵⁵  These factors make Russia both unable and unwilling to intervene on Iran’s behalf. 

Looking Ahead: Widening the Wedge

Recent events have proved yet again that Moscow and Tehran are little more than two revisionist powers primarily united by their shared adversaries. Moscow and Tehran’s relationship has been defined by contestation and competition, facing a series of downturns. While the bilateral relationship has been on an upswing since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea—which cemented its increasing isolation from the West—the partnership only significantly expanded after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

Nonetheless, Russia will remain interested in Tehran and in maintaining its strategic position in the Middle East vis-à-vis Iran. U.S. policymakers have an opportunity to exploit the weaknesses in Russia and Iran’s limited partnership. Doing so would push Moscow and Tehran further apart, and in turn, deal a serious blow to the broader Axis of Autocracies. Washington’s objective should therefore not be to confront a consolidated Russia-Iran bloc, but to prevent its consolidation in the first place by deepening the fissures identified above. The following three lines of effort should guide U.S. policy.

Sharpen the Trust Deficit

First, Moscow’s calculated restraint during the recent conflict is the clearest evidence yet of Russian unreliability. The United States and its partners should ensure that this lesson is not lost on Iranian decision-makers, amplifying through both public diplomacy and quiet channels the long and obvious record of Russian opportunism. Tehran already regards Moscow with deep skepticism; U.S. messaging should reinforce that perception—and deny Russia the ability to recast itself as a loyal partner—rather than allow the memory of Moscow’s abandonment to fade.

Cap the Defense Relationship

A Russian delivery of the advanced air defense systems, Su-35 fighters, and precision munitions that Tehran has long sought could threaten to transform the current partnership of convenience into something approaching a genuine alliance. Moscow has repeatedly delayed these transfers, however, both because it needs the hardware for its own war in Ukraine and because it is wary of antagonizing Israel and the Gulf states. Washington should raise the cost of any such transfer still further through rigorous sanctions enforcement, secondary sanctions on facilitating entities, and close coordination with the regional partners who share an interest in limiting Iran’s capabilities. The aim is to keep the partnership capped at drone production and gray-zone cooperation rather than allowing it to mature into genuine defense integration.

Exploit the Asymmetries

With its domestic Shahed production now largely independent from Iran, Moscow needs Tehran less than it once did, leaving Iran more dependent and exposed. The United States should preserve this asymmetry rather than erase it through blanket measures that hand the two an “isolated together” mentality and a shared incentive to integrate. Policymakers should likewise avoid enriching Moscow as a byproduct of pressure on Tehran: disruptions spike energy prices or choke Gulf exports have already padded Russian revenues by an estimated $150 million per day, helping to finance its war against Ukraine.⁵⁶ Calibrated, differentiated pressure will do more to divide the two than any sweeping measure that inadvertently unites them.

Pursued in concert, these measures would keep Moscow and Tehran fixed in precisely the role each already assigns the other: a quid pro quo partnership of convenience, never a true ally. Widening that wedge is among the most effective blows the United States can strike against the broader Axis of Autocracies.

Priya Swyden graduated from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) with a master’s degree in European public policy and from the Graduate Institute Geneva with a master’s degree in international affairs and global security. Priya is an alumna of SSS Iran.

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Image: 2017-03-28 Vladimir Putin and President of Iran Hassan Rouhani, March 28, 2017, from The Kremlin. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2017-03-28_Vladimir_Putin_and_President_of_Iran_Hassan_Rouhani.jpg.

[1] Julian G. Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship: Political, Military, and Economic Dimensions of an Improving Partnership (Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation, January 2025), https://www.cna.org/reports/2025/01/The-Evolving-Russia-Iran-Relationship.pdf.

[2]  Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship.

[3] Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia and Iran Sign a Partnership Treaty to Deepen Their Ties in the Face of Western Sanctions,” AP News, January 17, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-putin-pezeshkian-treaty-af3d3112f01749c45b9c3f3272702e11.

[4] “The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion: Impact of World War II on Iran,” The Lion and the Sun Podcast, 23 June 2025, https://thelionandthesun.org/1126/the-shah-the-nazis-and-the-invasion-impact-of-world-war-ii-on-iran/.

[5] “The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion.”

[6] “The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion.”

[7] “The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion.”

[8] “The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion.”

[9]  Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship.

[10] “The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion.”

[11] Isachenkov, “Russia and Iran Sign,” AP News.

[12] Isachenkov, “Russia and Iran Sign,” AP News.

[13] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Summary,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), accessed May 22, 2026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/summary.

[14] Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[15] Roham Alvandi, “Flirting with Neutrality: The Shah, Khrushchev, and the Failed 1959 Soviet-Iranian Negotiations,” Iranian Studies 47, no. 3 (2014): 419–440.

[16] Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship.

[17] Central Intelligence Agency, Moscow’s Tilt Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq, DOC-0000500597 (Declassified CIA electronic reading room PDF), https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000500597.pdf.

[18] Central Intelligence Agency, “Moscow’s Tilt Toward Baghdad.”

[19] Central Intelligence Agency, “Moscow’s Tilt Toward Baghdad.”

[20] Central Intelligence Agency, “Moscow’s Tilt Toward Baghdad.”

[21] Central Intelligence Agency, “Moscow’s Tilt Toward Baghdad.”

[22] Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship.

[23] Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship.

[24] Alexander Gabuev et al., “Why Russia Is Watching Iran Burn,” Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/why-russia-watching-iran-burn.

[25] Nicole Grajewski, “The Evolution of Russian and Iranian Cooperation in Syria,” CSIS, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria.

[26] Anna Borshchevskaya, “The Treacherous Triangle of Syria, Iran, and Russia,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2023), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/treacherous-triangle-syria-iran-and-russia.

[27] Alexander Gabuev et al., “Why Russia,” Foreign Affairs; Borshchevskaya, “The Treacherous Triangle of Syria, Iran, and Russia.” 

[28] Mohsen Milani, “Iran and Russia’s Uncomfortable Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, August 31, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-08-31/iran-and-russias-uncomfortable-alliance

[29] Milani, “Iran and Russia’s Uncomfortable Alliance.”

[30] Milani, “Iran and Russia’s Uncomfortable Alliance.”

[31] Grajewski, “Evolution of Russian and Iranian Cooperation in Syria.”

[32] Grajewski, “Evolution of Russian and Iranian Cooperation in Syria.”

[33] Grajewski, “Evolution of Russian and Iranian Cooperation in Syria.”

[34] Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Military Intervention in Syria: Long-Term Implications,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 15, 2015, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-intervention-syria-long-term-implications.

[35] Hamidreza Azizi, “Strategic Transactionalism: The Iran-Russia Partnership” Issue Brief (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, June 5, 2025), https://mecouncil.org/publication/strategic-transactionalism-the-iran-russia-partnership/.

[36] Guy Faulconbridge et al., “Iran Is Said to Have Sent Russia $2.7 Billion Worth of Missiles,” Bloomberg, January 12, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-12/iran-is-said-to-have-sent-russia-2-7-billion-worth-of-missiles.

[37] “Iran Is Said to Have Sent Russia $2.7 Billion Worth of Missiles.”

[38] Nikita Smagin, “How Far Can Russian Arms Help Iran?” Commentary, Carnegie Politika, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 28, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/02/russia-iran-military-support.

[39] Nikita Smagin, “What Does War in the Middle East Mean for Russia-Iran Ties?” Commentary, Carnegie Politika, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 6, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/03/iran-russia-after-khamenei. 

[40] Erika Holmquist and Ismail Khan, “Isolated Together: Russian-Iranian Military Cooperation,” FOI Memo 8528 (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, May 2024), https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%208528.

[41] Olivia Gazis, “CIA Director William Burns Says Ties between Russia, Iran Suffer from ‘Limits,’ Lack of Trust,” CBS News, 20 July 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-director-russia-iran-ties-suffer-lack-of-trust/.

[42] Holmquist and Khan, “Isolated Together.” 

[43] Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship. 

[44] Alexander Gabuev et al., “Why Russia.”

[45] Azizi, “Strategic Transactionalism.”

[46] Ned Garvey and The Moscow Times, “A Strategic Partnership, Not a Military Alliance: Russia’s Role in the Israel-Iran Conflict,” The Moscow Times, June 16, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/16/a-strategic-partnership-not-a-military-alliance-russias-role-in-the-israel-iran-conflict-a89452.

[47] Waller et al., The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship.

[48] Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Failing Eastward Pivot? The Limits and Risks of Russia-China Alignment,” Brief Analysis, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 30, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-failing-eastward-pivot-limits-and-risks-russia-china-alignment.

[49] World Bank, “Strait of Hormuz Disruption Sends Oil Prices Surging,” World Bank Blogs (Commodity Markets Outlook, April 2026), May 8, 2026, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/strait-of-hormuz-disruption-sends-oil-prices-surging. 

[50] Alexander Gabuev et al., “Why Russia.”

[51] “Russia Sees Rising Oil Revenue on Iran War Energy Shock,” The National, May 22, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/05/22/russia-sees-rising-oil-revenue-on-iran-war-energy-shock/.

[52] “Russian Oil Exports Hit 2026 High as Iran Waiver Threatens Sales,” Bloomberg, June 23, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-23/russia-oil-exports-are-the-highest-this-year-but-face-competition-from-iran. 

[53] Alexander Gabuev et al., “Why Russia.”

[54] Vladimir Putin, “Condolences over the Assassination of Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei,” The Kremlin, March 1, 2026, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79238. 

[55] Alexander Gabuev et al., “Why Russia.”

[56] Anastasia Stognei et al., “Russia Rakes in $150mn a day in extra revenue from surging oil prices, Financial Times, October 15, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/dd973148-b6a1-4096-97da-3090a058fe08.