War, as Clausewitz wrote, is the continuation of politics by other means. This in turn means that civil-military relations become of prime importance. This book, by Eliot Cohen, is the best treatment of this subject. Some argue that once political leaders opt for war, decisions on strategy and operations should be in the hands of military professionals. Others argue that, because war is about political objectives, civilian leaders should hold the reins. These simple models ignore the fact that, over time, neither side in the civil-military divide has had a monopoly on good judgment. The author, through case studies of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion, shows that “supreme command” is best exercised through a continuing—and often contentious—dialogue between civilian leaders and their top military officers. Cohen’s argument for a model based on a blended form of civil-military decision making in war is the last word on this subject.
Guiding Questions
- What qualities does Cohen identify as essential for effective wartime leadership, and how are these illustrated through his four case studies?
- How does the book critique the idea of strict military autonomy in strategic decision-making?