Dying in Darkness: The Consequential Downfall of Hong Kong’s Free Press

A free and fair press is a cornerstone of democracy. It provides a bulwark against tyranny, a voice for the people, and accountability for injustices. As a result, the media can impact international policy, trade, and business opportunities. While, like other places globally, Hong Kong is suffering from the decline of its local media, its challenges are also unique. Through revisions and additions in law and policy, hastened by private sector developments and other geopolitical factors, the city has witnessed a hostile takeover of its democratic press as part of its forced integration with mainland China. This evolving situation goes beyond Hong Kong’s independence and internal affairs, with significant repercussions for international politics.

The media industry’s authoritarian takeover has exacerbated the downturn of U.S.-China relations. The United States should actively promote press freedom by publicly advocating for Hong Kong’s return to democracy and privately emphasizing its importance in diplomatic negotiations with China. by consistently emphasizing Hong Kong’s democratic status as crucial to U.S.-China relations and private commerce, the United States can help restore the city’s role as a bridge between the two nations without unnecessarily escalating tensions.

Early Historical Context

The crucial antecedents of Hong Kong’s media history were set during the city’s complicated time as part of the British Empire. In 1842, China officially ceded Hong Kong Island – at that time a barren rock – to the British Empire, as part of the “Unequal Treaties” which ended the First Opium War. Great Britain then claimed the Kowloon Peninsula after the Second Opium War in 1860 and signed a 99-year lease for the surrounding mainland area (also known as the New Territories) in 1898, thus uniting its control over Hong Kong. [1] Over the 20th century, the city saw enormous population and economic growth. After the costly civil war and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Hong Kong leveraged its ideal location and comparative political autonomy to overtake Shanghai as the primary international hub of the Chinese region. Consequently, the city began to attract American business investment and political interest, yet an uncertain future loomed ahead.

As a British colony, Hong Kong had a thriving free press, headlined by a booming newspaper industry. However, as the lease neared its end and China consolidated power, the United Kingdom (UK)sought legal safeguards to prevent Hong Kong’s absorption into the CCP’s authoritarian order. [2] Thus, the UK introduced two key legal ordinances to uphold Hong Kong’s democratic status per international standards. Reluctantly accepted by the PRC, the basic Law and the Hong Kong bill of Rights safeguarded Hong Kong’s media freedom for decades. Moreover, these legal frameworks bolstered the city’s democracy, economy, and involvement in U.S.-China relations.

The Basic Law, enacted by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1990, took effect after the British handover. As the foundation of the “One Country, Two Systems” ideology, it remains Hong Kong’s most important government document. Article 27 states that “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike.” [3] The Basic Law also ensured Hong Kong aligned with both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), two benchmark international standards. The PRC implemented the ICESCR but infamously never ratified the ICCPR, reaffirming its divide with Hong Kong in matters of individual rights.

To complement the basic Law’s emphasis on free speech and press, the UK introduced the Hong Kong bill of Rights in 1989. Article 16 states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” [4] With the frameworks of these two documents, Hong Kong boasted one of the least restrictive media landscapes for many years, placing 18th in the 2002 Reporters Without borders World Ranking. [5] While the industry remained primarily local, Hong Kong embraced the globalization of its press, collaborating with foreign outlets like The New York Times. [6] Signaling an openness to foreign exchange without compromising economic access to China, such developments enhanced the city’s international economic status and deepened U.S. engagement in the region.

Hong Kong’s Free Press as a Pillar of U.S.-China Relations

Amongst the most powerful impacts of Hong Kong’s ability to maintain its democracy post-handover was its key relationship with the United States. In the groundbreaking U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, the United States pledged its support to Hong Kong’s democratic freedom and economic prosperity and agreed to treat it as a distinct, albeit non-sovereign, entity. According to a U.S. Department of State report on the policy, a key consideration in this decision was that “the Hong Kong press remained free and continued to comment critically on issues.” [7] The report specifically noted the media’s role in critically evaluating the proposed Article 23 of the basic Law, which sought to vaguely criminalize government criticism. Though the law did not pass at the time, it has since resurfaced as a contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. This history is an example of how safeguarding Hong Kong’s press freedom directly influenced U.S. engagement with the region.

Furthermore, these policy changes significantly affected international economic exchange in Hong Kong, as well as U.S.-China relations. Hong Kong’s free economy, historically cosmopolitan culture, advantageous location, and newly reaffirmed U.S. support made it an ideal location for American business exchange. Although its global economic development took root in the 1980s and 1990s, the city began to emerge as one of the world’s leading finance centers at the turn of the millennium; its two largest trading partners as a Special Administrative Region were the United States and China. [8] In this way, Hong Kong earned its lucrative status as a bridge between the East and West. American companies and politics massively benefited from its direct access to the mainland while simultaneously finding protection in its democracy and relative autonomy from the PRC. Hong Kong’s media freedom, though sometimes overlooked, helped secure American commitment to the city, ushering in extensive private and public sector exchange with China.

The Downfall of Media Independence

After a brief golden age, weaknesses in Hong Kong’s free media appeared in the 2010s. Media outlets faced increasingly severe crackdowns from their own editorial boards and owners, creating a climate of self- censorship. This was rooted in the 1990s when the PRC began co-opting rich international tycoons to buy into the Hong Kong media industry and exert pro-CCP influence. by 2011, over 39 percent of the city’s surveyed journalists viewed self-censorship as present and serious, compared to only 13.3 percent in 2001. [9] Accompanying this concerning trend was the 2014 Umbrella Movement, in which Hong Kong residents demonstrated against Chinese restrictions on their elections, using social media to promote their cause to the international community. The PRC deployed extensive cybersecurity and surveillance to identify, censor, and imprison these peaceful protestors and journalists. [10] These developments demonstrated the CCP’s growing desire to manipulate Hong Kong’s media, and its rapidly increasing capacity to do so.

However, no event has been more destructive to Hong Kong’s media landscape than China’s response to Hong Kong’s 2019 protests. This movement opposed a bill that would have permitted extraditions of Hong Kong residents to mainland China and inspired millions to protest throughout the city. Protests mainly took the form of peaceful marches, but vandalism and conflict with law enforcement also occurred. [11] In retaliation, the PRC harshly suppressed protestors and introduced the National Security Law (NSL) in 2020. As powerful as it is vague, the NSL expanded and intensified penalties against Hong Kong residents who advocate for secession from China, subversion of the central government, terrorism, use of violence against others, or collusion with foreign forces. [12] This document signified the demise of Hong Kong’s historically free press. In the months that followed, the CCP orchestrated an outright attack against several of the city’s remaining independent outlets and public figures, including Apple Daily founder Jimmy Lai, whose trial for “conspiracy to collude with foreign forces” garnered international attention. [13]

China continues to weaken Hong Kong’s press, protestors, and journalists, most recently with the basic Law Article 23, passed in March 2024. This measure applies mainland China’s definitions of “state secrets” and “national security” to Hong Kong, strengthening the NSL and providing even more room to harshly persecute dissenters. [14] The article was initially proposed over two decades prior, as noted earlier, but local media proved successful in portraying its downsides, a journalistic effort that impressed even the United States government from afar. Thus, its dramatic passing this year clearly displays the stark contrast between the media industry’s near-complete freedom at that time and its submission to authoritarianism today. Although this development may seem isolated and localized, it has already begun to impact U.S. economic opportunities and strain diplomatic relations with both Hong Kong and China.

The Economic Fallout: U.S. business and Investment Retreat

The United States’ scorning of China and divestment from Hong Kong can be felt in the private sector as much as in government. Over the past decade, as the CCP’s authoritarian shadow over Hong Kong grew ever darker, American companies and prominent business leaders expressed waning confidence in the city’s lasting potential as an economic hub. Stephen Roach, former chair of Asia operations at the powerful investment bank Morgan Stanley, summarized this sentiment in his Financial Times article, aptly titled, “It pains me to say Hong Kong is over.” Roach explains that the city’s prized Hang Seng stock index has fallen by over 45 percent since 2019 because of deterioration in U.S.-China relations and beijing’s harsh legal crackdown on democratic protests. Consequently, the city’s business sector has lost its “extraordinary energy” and promise as “perfectly positioned as the major beneficiary [of China’s enormous 21st century development].” [15] Roach’s pessimistic outlook carries significant influence as a leading expert on the field which largely fueled Hong Kong’s rise to stardom. Furthermore, he certainly does not stand alone in predicting an adverse future for the city.

In addition to the finance industry, American corporations in various sectors have been reducing their physical and economic presence in Hong Kong. For example, the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal have all changed their regional centers to other cities in China. This unfortunate outcome is a somewhat predictable result of the NSL’s grave endangerment of foreign journalists in the city, yet still symbolic of the decline in Hong Kong’s internal democracy and openness to the world. Many other American companies have abandoned Hong Kong as well. between 2020 and 2023, 168 U.S. firms moved their regional headquarters out of the city in response to recent security concerns and the rise of other locations, especially Singapore, as safer alternatives. [16] China’s authoritarian takeover of Hong Kong, spearheaded by its multifaceted attack on the media, has severed an economic bridge with the United States and further worsened the prospects of future relations.

U.S. Policy Responses: Past Actions and Potential Strategies

Just as U.S.-China relations benefited from the legal protection of Hong Kong’s democratic media, relations suffered from these recent democratic backslides. In direct response to the NSL, the United States implemented punitive policies toward Hong Kong and imposed stricter measures on China. President Trump issued Executive Order 13936 in July 2020, which declared that the United States can no longer justifiably view the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) as different from the rest of China and that American policy exemptions for the region would be eliminated as a matter of national security. In its leading statement, the order stresses that the NSL is “potentially making it harder for journalists, human rights organizations, and other outside groups to hold the PRC accountable for its treatment of the people of Hong Kong.” [17] Clearly, media freedom was a core part of the foundation that allowed Hong Kong to connect two great foreign powers; thus, its decline contributes to the overall deterioration of U.S.-China relations.

The Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which closely accompanied Executive Order 13936, directly imposed U.S. sanctions on “foreign individuals and entities that materially contribute to China’s failure to preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy.” [18] The act also emphasizes the importance of Hong Kong’s domestic civil rights protections, specifically regarding freedom of speech. Accordingly, it can safely be assumed that the NSL’s targeting and censorship of media influenced American responses. These two policies not only promote divestment from the region and impose sanctions on prominent CCP-backed figures and institutions but also signify that the United States is willing to further strain its already tense relationship with China to defend Hong Kong’s democratic status. Rather than allowing sanctions to function as indefinite punitive measures, the right U.S. approach would offer the gradual removal of economic restrictions in direct exchange for concrete steps toward media freedom. This revised strategy would demonstrate an urgency to counteract Hong Kong’s grim trajectory, not merely criticize it.

In addition, external cooperation could massively benefit the United States’ agenda in Hong Kong. For example, diplomatic engagement through multilateral forums such as ASEAN and the G7 would leverage international pressure to push for Hong Kong’s autonomy without resorting to inflammatory rhetoric or zero-sum policymaking. Through these institutions, the United States could introduce a policy linking economic incentives to press freedom and offering subsidies or tax breaks to firms seeking to reinvest in Hong Kong if China lifts restrictions on independent media. If directly presented with the potential for massive foreign investment, the CCP may consider reinstating Apple Daily, removing NSL-based constraints on journalists, and allowing foreign media to operate without censorship. by offering both pathways for progress in diplomacy and business, the United States could more effectively uphold democratic values in Hong Kong while maintaining stability in its relationship with China.

Beyond Policy: The Role of U.S. Rhetoric and Public Diplomacy

In addition to its policy responses, the United States has extensively condemned China for its implementation of the NSL through derogatory public statements on the international stage. One such statement in 2023, signed by the United States and twenty-three other countries, specifically criticizes the rise in self-censorship and prosecution of journalists, calling these shifts the antithesis of Hong Kong’s long- standing prosperity and reputation. [19] Another U.S.-led coalition in 2022 declared broader concern for “the deterioration of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong,” and subsequently urged China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. [19] Meanwhile, the consequences of China’s enactment of the basic Law Article 23 are still unfolding, but it has already provoked further spite from the United States. In March 2024, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Vedant Patel argued that Article 23 could potentially “accelerate the closing of Hong Kong’s once open society,” and that Washington will not hesitate to use “the other actions the United States has at its disposal.” [21] In response, the Chinese embassy in Washington publicly voiced its dissatisfaction with constant American smearing of the CCP and attempted tampering in its affairs. [22] These documents reiterate that the United States views Hong Kong’s media status as important enough to warrant hostility in dealings with China altogether, and as grounds to bring up broader talking points, such as general neglect for global human rights standards.

Regardless of its ideological basis, this pattern of inflammatory rhetoric has primarily been counterproductive, deepening hostilities without offering a path forward. While standing up for democracy in Hong Kong is crucial, U.S. public statements should take care to frame their advocacy as a means of restoring Hong Kong’s previous economic openness – a status that has historically benefited all parties – rather than as an attack on the legitimacy of China’s governance. Publicly shifting from reactionary criticism to constructive diplomacy would signal a genuine commitment to addressing the crisis rather than escalating tensions.

Conclusion and Future Outlook

Hong Kong’s fall from democracy has been well-documented in news, social media, and popular culture. However, the true global significance of this event cannot be fully understood without a historical review of the city’s standing in U.S.-China relations. U.S. political and economic interests in Hong Kong predate even the 1997 handover from the UK, but it was the city’s commitment to civil rights – namely, freedom of the press – that secured official and large-scale U.S. support. However, since 2002, the city has fallen from 18th to 135th in Reporters Without borders World Ranking, U.S. political support and economic involvement in Hong Kong have stagnated, and U.S.-China relations have deteriorated. [23] Hong Kong’s media freedom is a critical component of U.S. investment in and backing of the city, and its dealings toward China as a whole. Accordingly, the United States must adopt a more pragmatic and patient approach to restoring it, emphasizing mutual benefits with China and offering direct incentives for redemocratization.

Critics may argue that these recommendations signify a concession to China rather than a firm stance in support of Hong Kong’s democracy. However, this perspective underestimates the practical benefits of collaboration. A diplomatic approach does not represent a departure from the United States’ commitment to Hong Kong’s democratic principles but rather demonstrates a genuine effort to restore such values. by emphasizing the economic and geopolitical benefits of maintaining Hong Kong as a hub for exchange with the West, this strategy highlights the mutual advantages of a more open and autonomous Hong Kong to China’s government. In contrast, a purely adversarial approach exacerbates political tensions, as shown by China’s repeated opposition to U.S. comments on Hong Kong, and disengagement altogether forfeits significant economic and geopolitical opportunities.

As things stand, the prospects for Hong Kong’s return to freedom and prosperity appear bleak. The CCP has consistently prioritized its authority over its commitments, openly defying the “One Country, Two Systems” promise of the 1997 handover. Meanwhile, U.S. support for Hong Kong remains tied to the very freedoms that China has systematically dismantled, leaving the city trapped in a geopolitical deadlock. If Hong Kong is to reclaim its status as a global hub of exchange, both China and the United States must recognize the stakes. beijing is not blind to the political and economic value Hong Kong provides, and Washington must adopt a more forward-looking policy — one that does not waver in principle but actively seeks leverage points to encourage the restoration of democratic institutions. Press freedom, a cornerstone of Hong Kong’s once-vibrant civil society, is the most critical starting point. If China ever chooses pragmatism over repression, and if the United States plays a more strategic role in making that choice worthwhile, the city may still have a path back to its former standing.

Graham Owens ’27 is a member of the AHS chapter at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is majoring in International Relations.

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Notes:

[1] The National Archives, Hong Kong and the Opium Wars, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/hong-kong-and-the-opium-wars/

[2] Alvin Rabushka, Freedom’s Fall in Hong Kong, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1997), https://www.hoover.org/research/freedoms-fall-hong-kong

[3] “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” HK e-Legislation, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A101

[4] “Cap. 383 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,” HK e-Legislation, https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap383?xpid=ID_1438403137111_001

[5] “Reporters Without Borders Publishes the First Worldwide Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, 2002, https://rsf.org/en/reporters-without-borders-publishes-first-worldwide-press-freedom-index-october-2002

[6] Keith Bradsher, “In Hong Kong, a Bureau Evolves With Its City,” The New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/insider/in-hong-kong-a-bureau-evolves-with-its-city.html

[7] “U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act Report,” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2003, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/19562.htm

[8] “The Economy in 2000,” Hong Kong Government Yearbook, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government, 2000), https://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2000/eng/04/c04-01.htm

[9] Francis L. F. Lee, “Changing Political Economy of the Hong Kong Media,” OpenEdition Journals, 2018, https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/8009

[10] Grace Shao, “Social Media Has Become a Battleground in Hong Kong’s Protests,” CNBC, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/16/social-media-has-become-a-battleground-in-hong-kongs-protests.html

[11] “Hong Kong’s Protests Explained,” Amnesty International, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/

[12] Baker McKenzie, Hong Kong National Security Law Summary, 2020, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2020/06/hong-kong-national-security-law-summary.pdf

[13] Jessie Pang and Edward Cho, “National Security Trial of Hong Kong Media Tycoon Jimmy Lai: What’s Happened So Far,” Reuters, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/national-security-trial-tycoon-jimmy-lai-whats-happened-so-far-2024-01-11/

[14] “What is Hong Kong’s Article 23 Law? 10 Things You Need to Know,” Amnesty International, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/what-is-hong-kongs-article-23-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/

[15] Stephen Roach, “It Pains Me to Say Hong Kong Is Over,” Financial Times, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/27a2c28e-d28b-444c-97fd-4616ed32c675

[16] Brian C. H. Fong, “The Fall of Hong Kong: How China-US Rivalry Ended a Geopolitical Neutral Zone,” The Diplomat, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/the-fall-of-hong-kong-how-china-us-rivalry-ended-a-geopolitical-neutral-zone/

[17] “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization,” Federal Register, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization

[18] U.S. Congress, H.R.7440 – Hong Kong Autonomy Act, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440

[19] “Media Freedom Coalition Statement on the Second Anniversary of the Closure of Stand News and Media Freedom in Hong Kong,” U.S. Department of State, 2023, https://2021-2025.state.gov/media-freedom-coalition-statement-on-the-second-anniversary-of-the-closure-of-stand-news-and-media-freedom-in-hong-kong/

[20] “U.S. Joins Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in China,” U.S. Mission Geneva, 2022, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2022/06/14/us-joins-joint-statement-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-china-hrc-50/

[21] Kenji Kawase, “Hong Kong’s New Security Law Raises International Concerns,” Nikkei Asia, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Hong-Kong-security-law/Hong-Kong-s-new-security-law-raises-international-concerns

[22] “China Hits Back at US for Criticizing New Hong Kong Security Law,” Reuters, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-hits-back-us-criticising-new-hong-kong-security-law-2024-03-21/

[23] “Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, 2024, https://rsf.org/en/2024-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-under-political-pressure

Image: “In a police press conference in the afternoon, police representatives stated that the laser pointers he purchased were in fact “laser guns.” They attempted to demonstrate that the “laser gun” HKBU student union president Keith Fong purchased is able to burn a hole in a paper by pointing it to a black area of a newspaper and holding it steadily for 20 seconds at very short distance. At night, hundreds gathered at Hong Kong Space Museum with their laser pointers in protest of selective legal enforcement and the arrest of Fong. Protesters responded by pointing all their laser pointer to the newspaper held, mocking the police’s demonstration,” by Studio Incendo, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:20190807_Hong_Kong_anti-extradition_bill_protest_(48480850197).jpg. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.