Underground Asset: Latin America and the Minerals Security Partnership

The global race for critical minerals has become a defining feature of twenty-first century geopolitics, fundamentally shaping national security and economic power. These minerals, essential for everything from advanced military systems to renewable energy technologies, are of concern to the United States because of the overwhelming control of global supply chains by one country: the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As the United States seeks to counter this mineral dependency, Latin America’s vast reserves offer a solution through the recently established Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). Though the MSP Forum includes Latin American nations, their exclusion from full MSP partnership restricts the potential for a secure and diversified mineral supply chain. While past environmental impacts, infrastructure gaps, and state control challenges contributed to this limited role, recent regulatory reforms suggest it is time to reassess their full integration. Expanding MSP membership to include Latin American partners would allow the United States to strengthen hemispheric ties, establish more resilient critical mineral supply chains, and reduce China’s outsized influence in global mineral markets.

The Security Risk of Monopolistic Control in Critical Mineral Supply Chains

Critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for contemporary consumer technology and defense systems. The United States Geological Survey documents significant U.S. dependence on these minerals, with 100 percent import reliance for 16 key minerals and over 50 percent for another 33. [1] China’s control over approximately 90 percent of the world’s REE processing capacity, 60 percent of the world’s lithium processing capacity, and 72 percent of cobalt refining operations as of 2023 presents a serious national security risk. [2] This dominance affords the PRC significant influence over global prices and availability, as even countries with reserves must rely on Beijing for refinement.

China has already demonstrated a willingness to weaponize its dominance of critical minerals against the United States. During the 2019 U.S.-China trade tensions, Beijing’s threat to restrict rare earth exports alarmed U.S. manufacturing sectors. This action prompted governmental investment in domestic rare earth processing capabilities and support for reopening the REE-rich Mountain Pass Mine in California. [3] In 2023, Beijing retaliated against Washington restricting semiconductor exports by imposing export controls on gallium and germanium, two metals crucial for semiconductor manufacturing; and in 2024, China escalated its measures by banning exports of antimony and other materials to the United States. Following the imposition of high U.S. tariffs in early 2025, Beijing further expanded its controls to include five additional critical metals used in defense and clean energy industries. [4] This response created significant disruptions in global semiconductor supply chains, reinforcing the need to develop alternative sources and processing capabilities.

History well documents how nations use resource dependencies as tools of economic and geopolitical coercion. Russia’s repeated use of natural gas exports to influence European policy is perhaps the most well known in recent memory. [5] As former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan articulated in his 2023 address at the Brookings Institution, resource manipulation transcends market dynamics to become a foundational element of authoritarian statecraft. [6] Revenue streams from strategic resources can create patron-client networks that cement elite loyalty, fund sophisticated surveillance and suppression apparatuses to enable digital authoritarianism, and allow authoritarian regimes to present themselves as indispensable partners to democratic nations, thereby gaining legitimacy while undermining democratic institutions through their leverage. [7] Controlling the supply of REEs and other strategic minerals grants the power to shape technological development paths and, by extension, societal organization. The economic risks of market reliance are clear, but when material control translates directly into ideological influence, the threat becomes even more profound.

The Role of Latin America in Global Mineral Reserves

In Latin America, Chinese companies are moving to establish critical mineral preeminence through their regional investment strategy. The China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China have provided over $137 billion in financing to Latin American governments and companies since 2005, directing much of these funds toward securing majority stakes in mining and processing operations. [8] This has given Chinese state-owned enterprises privileged access to mineral deposits, particularly in the “Lithium Triangle” of Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia. [9] Control of these deposits allows Chinese companies to secure raw materials and dominate the value chain. By processing these resources in Chinese facilities and then selling refined products back to Latin American markets at premium prices, Beijing creates a cycle of dependency. This strategy is an example of the PRC’s “South-South cooperation,” where it poses as a partner and fellow developing country to low-income states while simultaneously creating asymmetric economic relationships by ensuring that high-value processing activities remain in its dominion. [10] This method alters traditional trade patterns, ultimately harming the United States as long-term economic dependencies are born.

While the United States does possess some untapped domestic mineral potential, its limited production capacity makes partnerships in Latin America a more realistic way to secure the U.S. mineral supply chain and counter Chinese influence. The aforementioned Lithium Triangle holds over 58 percent of the world’s lithium reserves. [11] Brazil’s substantial niobium reserves and Chile’s copper deposits complement this profile. [12] Although the United States International Development Finance Corporation has already committed $400 million to develop sustainable mining projects in the region, the International Energy Agency cautions that the current investment growth in mining and exploration has decelerated compared to 2022. [13-14] This slowdown could raise the level of mineral resource development needed to meet future demand. More significant U.S. investment in the region is therefore crucial for securing the United States’ mineral supply chains and offering Latin American countries an alternative to Chinese economic influence.

The MSP Forum announced the partial inclusion of Argentina, Mexico, and Peru in early 2024, acknowledging their strategic importance yet denying them full participation and excluding other important countries altogether. The MSP and the MSP Forum are related but distinct initiatives. Established in 2022, the fifteen member MSP consists of full-fledged members that actively collaborate on securing critical mineral supply chains through investment and policy coordination. In contrast, the MSP Forum serves as a broader platform for dialogue, bringing in additional countries to discuss critical mineral challenges without granting them full partnership status. [15] This distinction is crucial, as inclusion in the Forum does not equate to direct access to the technology sharing and financial benefits of MSP membership. Given their vast mineral reserves and recent regulatory advancements, the current Forum-only status for Argentina, Mexico, and Peru represents a missed opportunity for both the United States and Latin America.

Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the United States and several Latin American countries issued in Summer 2024 intended to “Strengthen Cooperation on Critical Minerals” signify a step toward collaboration, but these ultimately lack substantive commitments. [16-17] Although symbolic of mutual understanding, MOUs lack binding commitments, rendering them diplomatic gestures rather than effective tools for advancing mining technologies, infrastructure, or meaningful supply chain diversification and highlighting the insufficiency of MSP Forum membership alone.

The Case for Mineral Security Partnership Membership

Full membership in the MSP for select Latin American countries is a tool with which the United States can benefit from Latin America’s abundant geological resources while also providing partner countries access to investment and technological support. For the United States, MSP expansion into Latin America would reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains while establishing reliable regional processing capabilities. Latin American countries would benefit from this investment; World Bank analysis suggests that domestic processing could increase revenue from mineral resources by 30-50 percent compared to raw material exports alone. [18] This development of regional processing capacity would give U.S. manufacturers closer, more reliable access to refined materials while reducing overall supply chain vulnerability to Chinese market manipulation and would help secure long-term U.S. access to the region’s resources.

Latin American countries have not been granted full MSP membership in the past due to concerns over environmental and labor standards. [19] However, significant reforms now signal readiness for integration. In Argentina, changes under President Javier Milei evince a clear commitment to fostering a stable, investment friendly environment that aligns with Western standards of transparency and collaboration. In the months following the announcement of participation in the MSP Forum, Argentinian officials have started initiatives like the National Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) and updated provincial mining codes, as seen in Mendoza. [20] The government has also lowered tax burdens, eased capital controls, and established extended regulatory certainty for mining projects through these developments. [21] Despite campaign rhetoric critical of Beijing and Argentina’s 2023 rejection of BRICS+ – an expanded coalition of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa-led bloc that seeks to counter Western-dominated institutions – Milei has continued to uphold key financial ties with China. These include the June 2024 renewal of a $5 billion USD currency swap agreement and permitting Chinese-backed company Rio Tinto to make a $2.5 billion USD investment in the Rincon lithium project. [22] While Milei may ideologically prefer closer ties with the West, economic constraints have compelled continued cooperation with China. To counterbalance China’s influence, the United States must present viable economic alternatives that align with Argentina’s interests and financial needs.

In April 2023, Mexico reformed its mining sector, suggesting a more substantial commitment to environmental and social responsibility. [23] The country’s Senate approved a comprehensive overhaul of its mining laws, requiring companies to allocate five percent of their profits to local communities. This policy shift aims to distribute economic benefits more quitably and ensures that mining operations contribute to regional development. The reforms impose stricter environmental impact assessments and grant the government greater oversight in awarding and revoking concessions, reducing the risks of corruption and unsustainable exploitation. These legislative changes place Mexico closer to the regulatory frameworks of MSP member states and demonstrate a heightened commitment to labor rights and environmental sustainability.

Non-MSP Forum member Chile similarly positions itself at the forefront of sustainable mining through its Vision 2030 strategy, emphasizing technological innovation and environmental stewardship. [24] A significant component of this strategy is the advancement of direct lithium extraction technologies, which significantly reduce water usage compared to traditional evaporation methods.

Beyond individual country reforms, the broader Latin American region has witnessed an uptick in adopting internationally recognized environmental and labor standards. Companies in these countries have shown growing commitment to International Organization of Standardization (ISO) 14001 certifications, which establish effective environmental management systems. Between 2022 and 2023, the number of ISO 14001 certified organizations in Latin American mining sectors increased notably, with Peru seeing the largest growth. [25] This shift marks a growing corporate emphasis on sustainability and compliance with global environmental benchmarks. Similarly, adherence to various International Labour Organization (ILO) standards has increased, reflecting greater protections for workers in hazardous mining environments. [26] Several Latin American countries have already participated as MSP Forum members, but they must transition from Forum participants to full MSP members to achieve real economic gains.

Additional concerns about resource nationalism need not deter MSP engagement either. While higher commodity prices have traditionally increased nationalization pressure, modern Latin American approaches have evolved significantly since expropriation of private companies was widespread across the region. Chile’s National Lithium Strategy, while characterized as ‘nationalization’ by foreign media, primarily emphasizes public-private partnerships rather than state takeovers. [27] Similarly, even under leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has positioned itself as a rules-based, private sector-friendly destination for mineral development. [28] Even countries with stronger state control aspirations, like Mexico and Bolivia, remain open to private partnerships, albeit with majority state ownership. [29] This evolution in resource governance demonstrates the potential for balanced cooperation that respects national sovereignty and international investment standards through the MSP.

The MSP strategy also boasts bipartisan support, as policies established during the first Trump administration and continued under the Biden administration show. Issued in December 2017, Executive Order 13817, “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” explicitly called for strengthening critical mineral supply chains through international partnerships. [30] The Department of Commerce’s response report contained Recommendation #3, which specifically advocated for increased opportunities to access and develop critical minerals through investment and trade with allies and partners. [31] The Biden administration encouraged similar programs to fulfill this practice. [32] This alignment demonstrates that including Latin American partners in the MSP would transcend partisan divides and offer a path for securing critical mineral supply chains that support regional development.

Conclusion

China’s dominance in critical mineral processing presents clear security risks for the United States. This resource control enables Beijing to exercise outsized influence on market dynamics, a foundational component of authoritarian statecraft that threatens the integrity of U.S. democracy. Certain Latin American nations participate in the MSP Forum, but their limited involvement prevents them from accessing the investment, technology sharing, and supply chain integration benefits that full MSP membership offers. As China continues to expand its influence in the region through strategic investments and resource control, the United States must recognize that Forum participation alone is insufficient to counterbalance these trends. Despite past concerns regarding environmental and labor standards, recent regulatory reforms and public-private initiatives indicate a shift toward greater compliance with international best practices. By transitioning from Forum participants to full MSP partners, these nations could strengthen their domestic industries while providing the United States with a more secure and diversified critical mineral supply chain. This would build upon bipartisan support in the United States for reshoring and securing supply chains. Ultimately, strengthening mineral partnerships with Latin America would be an important counter to the growth of Chinese influence and resource manipulation while at the same time supporting long-term industrial resilience in the Western Hemisphere. In the era of great power competition, such partnerships and resilience are critical to maintaining the global position of the United States.

Emma Hamilton ’26 serves as the Undergraduate Representative of the AHS chapter at the University of Texas at Austin, where she is majoring in Government and Plan II.

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Notes:

[1] United States Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2025, https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2025

[2] Cindy Hurst, China’s Rare Earth Elements Industry: What Can the West Learn? (Potomac, MD: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2010): 3-13, http://www.iags.org/rareearth0310hurst.pdf

[3] Lara Seligman, “China Dominates the Rare Earths Market. This U.S. Mine Is Trying to Change That,” Politico, December 14, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/14/rare-earth-mines-00071102

[4] Amy Lv et al., “China Expands Key Mineral Export Controls after US Imposes Tariffs,” Reuters, February 4, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-expands-critical-mineral-export-controls-after-us-imposes-tariffs-2025-02-04/

[5] “Europe’s Gas Crisis and Russian Energy Politics: Experts Respond,” Ukrainian Research Institute, November 1, 2021, https://www.huri.harvard.edu/tcup-commentary/europes-gas-crisis-russian-energy-politics

[6] “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing AmericanEconomic Leadership at the Brookings Institution,” The American Presidency Project, April 27, 2023, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-renewing-american-economic-leadership-the

[7] Erol Yaybok and Samuel Brannen, “Promote and Build: A Strategic Approach toDigital Authoritarianism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 15, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/promote-and-build-strategic-approach-digital-authoritarianism

[8] Diana Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri

[9] Gregory Wischer and Juan Pablo Villasmil, “China’s Critical Mineral Model in Latin America,” New Security Beat, July 24, 2023, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2023/07/chinas-critical-mineral-model-latin-america/

[10] Richard L. Harris et al., “China’s South–South Cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean,” SBGS Faculty Publications and Presentations, December 2016, https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/sbgs_fac/24

[11] Ryan Berg and T. Andrew Sady-Kennedy, “South America’s Lithium Triangle: Opportunities for the Biden Administration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 17, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-americas-lithium-triangle-opportunities-biden-administration

[12] International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024, 2024, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2024

[13] Development Finance Corporation, Infrastructure and Critical Minerals, 2024, https://www.dfc.gov/our-work/infrastructure-and-critical-minerals

[14] International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024”

[15] United States Department of State, Minerals Security Partnership, September 16, 2023, https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/

[16] “The United States of America and Peru Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Strengthen Cooperation on Critical Minerals,” United States Department of State, August 29, 2024, https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-of-america-and-peru-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-strengthen-cooperation-on-critical-minerals/

[17] “US and Argentina Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Strengthen Cooperation on Critical Minerals,” U.S. Embassy in Argentina, August 23, 2024, https://ar.usembassy.gov/us-and-argentina-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-strengthen-cooperation-on-critical-minerals/

[18] World Bank, Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/climate-smartmining-minerals-for-climate-action

[19] “Argentina’s Mendoza Province Open to Mining and Will Build Country’s First New Copper Mine Since 1997,” Fastmarkets, February 18, 2025, https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/argentinas-mendoza-province-open-to-mining-and-will-build-countrys-first-new-copper-mine-since-1997/

[20] Christopher Hernandez-Roy et al., “De-Risking Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The Role of Latin America,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 11, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/de-risking-critical-mineral-supply-chains-role-latin-america

[21] Jeff Amrish Ritoe, “A New Golden Age for Argentinian Mining? Why RIGI Has the Potential to Make Argentina a Critical Raw Materials Powerhouse,” The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, November 2024, https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/A-new-Golden-Age-for-Argentinian-Mining-2024.pdf

[22] Jason Marczak and Albe Ignacio, “Milei’s First Year Ends with Optimism. CanArgentina’s Momentum Continue in 2025?,” Atlantic Council, December 24, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mileis-first-year-ends-with-optimism-can-argentinas-momentum-continue-in-2025/

[23] “Mexico’s Ruling Party Sweeps Mine Reform, Other Bills to Law,” AP News, April 29, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-mining-reform-concessions-payments-laws-e039d83fbe72a90e1d2729d492cff2c5

[24] Fred Turville, “Direct Lithium Extraction, Cleantech Lithium,” CleanTech Lithium, August 19, 2022, https://ctlithium.com/about/direct-lithium-extraction/

[25] International Organization for Standardization, The ISO Survey of Management System Standard Certifications – 2023, https://www.iso.org/the-iso-survey.html

[26] International Labour Organization, 2023 Labour Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, December 19, 2023, https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40americas/%40ro-lima/documents/publication/wcms_907263.pdf

[27] Lauri Tähtinen and Henry Ziemer, “A Specter Haunting Latin American Mining? Not so Fast,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 9, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/specter-haunting-latin-american-mining-not-so-fast

[28] Tähtinen, “A Specter Haunting Latin American Mining? Not so Fast.”

[29] Tähtinen, “A Specter Haunting Latin American Mining? Not so Fast.”

[30] A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,Federal Register, December 26, 2017, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/12/26/2017-27899/a-federal-strategy-to-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-of-critical-minerals

[31] A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, U.S. Department of Commerce, June 4, 2019, https://www.commerce.gov/data-and-reports/reports/2019/06/federal-strategy-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-critical-minerals

[32] “Biden-Harris Administration Announces over $3 Billion to Support America’sBattery Manufacturing Sector, Create over 12,000 Jobs, and Enhance National Security,”U.S. Department of Energy, September 20, 2024, https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden- harris-administration-announces-over-3-billion-support-americas-battery

Image: “Argentina en 2024,” by Embajada de EEUU en Argentina, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Signing_of_Critical_Minerals_MOU_w-_FM_Diana_Mondino-12.jpg. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.