The Most Powerful Man in Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Ideological Tenets, Scope of Power, and Confrontations with the West

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Husseini Khamenei inherited and amassed incredible power across decades at the helm of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He holds dominion over Iran’s three branches of government and commands the armed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which serves as Iran’s primary means for exporting the revolution.¹ The Iranian economy is also largely governed by the state, with the Ayatollah and the IRGC controlling oil revenue and the country’s charitable foundations which account for billions of dollars in assets.² No high-level decision making in Iran is done outside of his purview.

On June 13, 2025, Israel began a series of strikes aimed at inflicting serious damage to Khamenei’s rapidly advancing nuclear program. Roughly a week later, after Israel severely damaged critical Iranian nuclear infrastructure and obliterated Iran’s air defense systems, the United States joined the assault and carried out precision strikes on three crucial Iranian nuclear sites utilizing Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs.³ Some analysts argue that these strikes may have “irreversibly degraded Iran’s drive for the bomb,” though the full extent of the damage remains unknown.⁴ Yet, rather than waving the white flag of surrender, Khamenei’s foreign minister addressed the international community in response, stating, “Iran reserves all options to defend its security interests and people.”⁵ Meanwhile, Khamenei has reportedly selected three possible successors while he hid in a bunker, scrambling to ensure the preservation of the Islamic Republic in the wake of catastrophic blows.⁶

To emerge victorious against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States and its allies must be clear-eyed about Ayatollah Khamenei’s true nature and objectives. While groups and individuals inside Iranian society work to oppose Khamenei and his Islamist policies, overestimating their influence or underestimating the scope of Khamenei’s power would be a mistake. As a result of his ideological tenets and duty to preserve the Islamic Republic, Khamenei will always make decisions on behalf of Iran that are rooted in anti-Western Islamist ideology and aimed at harming the United States and its allies. Accordingly, the United States must be savvy as it battles this regime, recognizing that in negotiations and military action, Khamenei will always prioritize Islamism and the continuation of the Islamic Republic.

Shaping Khamenei’s Ideology: His Early Years and The Islamic Revolution

The study and practice of Islam defined Sayyed Ali Husseini Khamenei’s early years. Born in 1939, he came from humble beginnings, growing up in a neighborhood in Mashhad, Iran as the second son of a Muslim religious scholar and jurist.⁷ Khamenei began his formal Muslim education at the age of four, and by age 11, he became a Shi’a cleric.⁸ Notably, Khamenei also developed a love for secular literature and poetry in his youth, which he used to escape the woes of his difficult home life, where his father frequently beat him for incorrectly reciting the Quran.⁹ It was in literary circles, not religious ones, that Khamenei was first exposed to politics and the revolutionary cause against the Pahlavi dynasty.¹⁰ 

After studying under his father and other prominent Islamic clerics whilst living in Mashhad, and briefly studying in Najaf, Iraq, Khamenei made his way to Qom—a hub for Shi’a Muslim clerics and home to numerous shrines and schools—in 1958 to attend Islamic seminary.¹¹ While in Qom, he met the future Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and his commitment to political Islam and Khomeini’s anti-Western cause began to take shape.¹² His entry into political activism quickly followed, and he was arrested for the first time in 1963 for delivering a letter to Shi’a clergy in Mashhad that was rife with Islamist propaganda against the Shah and his government.¹³ 

After spending six years in Qom, Khamenei returned to his hometown of Mashhad where, according to the Islamic Republic’s official biography, he taught high-level classes on Islamic law and Quranic commentary classes for the public that emphasized the need for revolution in Iran.¹⁴ In 1965, Khamenei spent the year translating Sayyid Qutb’s The Future Belongs to this Religion from Arabic to Persian, which solidified his zeal for advancing political Islam and opposing Western imperialism despite his early love of Western literature.¹⁵ 

Khamenei’s revolutionary pursuits brought him to various locations throughout Iran where he delivered speeches, organized political meetings, trained revolutionaries, and wrote opposition letters to topple the Pahlavi dynasty. Between 1963 and 1979, Khamenei was arrested, imprisoned, and exiled internally on several occasions for his lectures and activities in support of the revolutionary objectives of Khomeini.¹⁶ Nevertheless, his loyalty to Khomeini and his ideological tenets persisted. In January 1979, Khomeini appointed Khamenei and 12 other trusted revolutionaries to the Islamic Revolutionary Council, a secret entity aimed at facilitating the Islamist takeover.¹⁷ Shortly thereafter, Khomeini returned to Iran from exile and, on February 11, 1979, the revolutionaries declared victory and the Islamic Republic was born.¹⁸ 

Advancing the Islamist Vision: Khamenei’s Years as President

Iran’s new Supreme Leader Khomeini rewarded Ali Khamenei’s years of loyalty in the newly established Islamic Republic. As the emerging government took shape, Khamenei was appointed defense minister and supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.¹⁹ In 1981, the revolutionary elites nominated him, with the blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini, to run for president. He ultimately emerged victorious as the first clerical president in Iran’s history.²⁰

Khamenei’s inaugural speech was telling. He proudly touted his landslide victory as a vote of “trust for the clergy, a vote for Islam, a vote for independence and a vote for stamping out deviation, liberalism, and American-influenced leftists.’’²¹ While he privately questioned some of Khomeini’s anti-Western policies in the Islamic Republic’s early years, publicly, his first term was marked by total allegiance to Khomeini. Throughout his presidency, he worked to uphold velayat-e faqih, a governance system Khomeini reconceptualized to afford absolute religious and political authority to Islamic clerics and a supreme clerical leader (in this case, himself).²² Khamenei also played a large role in the evolution of Iranian universities from scientific institutions into Islamist indoctrination factories.²³ 

In 1984, Khamenei was appointed chairman of the new Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. Reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, the council was tasked with the “expansion and promotion of the influence of Islamic culture in the society…, purification of scientific and cultural establishments from materialistic ideas and clearing the country’s cultural environment from manifestations of Western influence, and development of universities, schools, and cultural and art centers in accordance with the righteous Islamic culture.”²⁴ 

In Iran’s tightly controlled election of 1985, Khamenei was selected for his second term as president. In this term, he prioritized cementing relationships with non-Western nations, establishing Iran as the center of the Muslim world, and spreading the Islamic Revolution as hallmarks of his incumbency.²⁵ According to the Islamic Republic’s official biography of Khamenei, this included:

…resistance against any move and measure on the path of the domination of superpowers in the region, paying careful attention to the issue of Quds and other occupied Palestinian lands, preparing the ground for fighting against the Zionist enemy, returning to the rich and original Islamic culture as a dam against enemies and transgressors, and showing efficient presence on the international scene.²⁶ 

Halfway through his second term, Khamenei delivered a speech to the United Nations (UN) in support of Iran and its revolutionary principles, decrying the suffering that Iran and the global community endured at the hands of America’s global hegemony.²⁷ In his words, “The hegemonic powers are the greatest cause of rationalizing and spreading corruption: moral corruption, sexual corruption and ideological corruption.”²⁸ The American and Israeli delegations walked out in protest.²⁹

In the last year of Khamenei’s presidency, Iran agreed to a ceasefire that ended its eight-year war with Iraq. When accepting UN Resolution 598 to end the war, Khamenei cited the Islamic Republic’s commitment to “saving the lives of human beings and the establishment of justice and regional and international peace and security.”³⁰ Notably, there was no renunciation of Khomeini’s pan-Islamist aspirations to export the revolution that fueled much of the regime’s war efforts.

Becoming Supreme Leader and Solidifying Power and Legitimacy

Ayatollah Khomeini perished shortly after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War. Before he passed, he sought to revise the Islamic Republic’s constitution to limit the religious qualifications necessary to assume the role of Supreme Leader, though he died before his amendments were ratified legally.³¹ Days after Khomeini’s death in June of 1989, Khamenei was selected to assume the role of Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts in a vote of 60 to 14.³² 

Khamenei’s selection was met with heavy suspicion from clerical elites and the Iranian public, given his youth and limited religious credentials.³³ Western media described him as a moderate, and Iranian leftists branded him as pro-American, only fueling existing skepticism despite his allegiance to Khomeini during his years as Supreme Leader.³⁴ To boost his credibility, Khamenei doubled down on anti-Americanism. According to scholar Mehdi Khalaji:

He (Khamenei) became the country’s loudest anti-American voice and the word enemy, meaning the United States, became the most frequent term in his personal lexicon. For Khamenei as Supreme Leader, anti-Americanism is something that transcends ideology. His true beliefs are secondary in importance to those which make him powerful. Anti-Americanism is one of the main components of his political identity.³⁵

Consequently, hostility toward the United States and its closest ally in the region, Israel, became pillars of Khamenei’s new mandate as Supreme Leader. Rooted in Khomeini’s Islamist anti-Western ideology that gave birth to the revolution, Khamenei saw hostility to the West as a mechanism to amass political support.³⁶ As Karim Sadjapour encapsulates: 

While Iranian foreign policy has evolved considerably since the early days of the revolution, the ideological edifice of the Islamic Republic remains built upon three important pillars: the mandatory veil (hejab) for women and opposition to the United States and Israel. Changing these policies would call into serious question the raison d’être of the Islamic system, blurring the lines between regime ideology and regime interests.³⁷

In confronting his ongoing challenge of legitimacy in his first few years as Supreme Leader, Khamenei replaced existing cabinet members with his appointees and expanded the responsibilities of the Office of the Supreme Leader.³⁸ Over the years, he slashed checks on his authority and by 1995, he established the Supreme Council of Religious Seminaries of Qom as a mechanism to control the clergy, ensuring that his religious authority would also go unquestioned.³⁹ He created a network of thousands of “clerical commissars” to reinforce his dominance across Iran in matters that pertain to the state.⁴⁰ Perhaps most significantly, Khamenei was able to reconceptualize jihad in Iran utilizing a juristic framework that gives him “the absolute authority to make any kind of decision at any given time, according to what he regards as excellent.”⁴¹ Today, Khamenei maintains an exceptional amount of constitutional authority resulting from his efforts to stifle opposition, consolidate power, and demonize the West.⁴²

Ideology in Action: Khamenei’s Jihadist Aggression

For Khamenei, jihad is more than jargon—it has served as and remains his guiding principle when directing the Islamic Republic’s aggressive actions toward the West.

Utilizing proxies that rely on Tehran for training and funding, Khamenei has been able to offload responsibility for nefarious actions that would have likely resulted in direct retaliation from the United States and Israel.⁴³ The first major attack on America after Khamenei assumed the role of Supreme Leader was the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing by Iran-backed Saudi Hezbollah, which killed 19 U.S. service members and wounded close to 500 people.⁴⁴ The attack was carried out with the explicit approval and support of Ayatollah Khamenei.⁴⁵ In 2011, a United States federal judge ruled that Iran had also supported al-Qaeda in its preparations for the September 11 attacks of 2001. According to Osama Bin Laden in a letter discovered by U.S. Navy SEALS in the raid on his compound, “Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication…”⁴⁶ Months after the attacks, President George W. Bush invoked Iran in his State of the Union address as a member of an “Axis of Evil” that supports terrorism and threatens the United States of America’s security.⁴⁷ In response, Khamenei adopted the “devil incarnate” label for the United States.⁴⁸

One of Khamenei’s most successful tactics to export the revolution and shore up ideological support has been utilizing both Sunni and Shia jihadist proxy militias throughout the Middle East to target the United States and Israel. Khamenei’s government has spent billions of dollars over the years propping up these terror proxies across the Middle East, including but not limited to Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthi movement.⁴⁹ 

Since its inception in 1982, Iran’s largest proxy force, Hezbollah, bears responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of Americans, primarily as a result of the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut and direct attacks during the insurgency in Iraq.⁵⁰ Utilizing Iranian funding, which Israel estimates at $700 million per year over the past decade, Hezbollah has accumulated capabilities akin to those of a medium-sized country’s army.⁵¹ Hezbollah’s late secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, repeatedly called for the destruction of the State of Israel and the end of U.S. hegemony throughout his tenure, in line with Khamenei’s anti-Western Islamist vision.⁵² In response to the killing of Nasrallah in an Israeli air strike, Khamenei pledged revenge and announced five days of mourning for Iran, citing Hezbollah as the forefront of the “forces of resistance.”⁵³

Hamas, another prominent Iranian proxy group that receives significant material assistance from Khamenei’s government (roughly $100 million annually), was founded with the explicit intent of destroying the State of Israel through jihad.⁵⁴ Though Iran was not involved in the establishment of the terror group, it began financially supporting the organization in 1992.⁵⁵ Throughout the Second Intifada and since taking over the Gaza Strip in 2007, the group has utilized funding authorized by Khamenei to terrorize Israeli civilians and build massive tunnel infrastructure to transport weapons and military personnel.⁵⁶ On October 7, 2023, the group facilitated the worst attack on Jews since the Holocaust, raping, murdering, and kidnapping innocent Israelis indiscriminately. Three days after the attack, Khamenei delivered a speech hailing the barbaric actions as an “irreparable defeat” of the Zionist regime.⁵⁷ 

Since October 7, Khamenei’s commitment to the destruction of Israel and the dismantling of the U.S.-led world order has remained steadfast. A few days before the first anniversary of the heinous attacks, he once again lauded the assault, stating that “any strike on the Zionist regime is a service to humanity.” He also reiterated his support for his proxy network, also known as the “axis of resistance,” and called for unity across the Muslim world in opposition to the United States and Israel.⁵⁸ Khamenei’s strategy of “creating and subsidizing Islamist militias in fractured Arab lands” has been difficult for his adversaries to counter.⁵⁹ 

U.S. Attempts to Counter Khamenei’s Regime: Successes and Failures

The United States’ approach to neutralizing threats from Khamenei and his authoritarian regime has varied across presidential administrations. While the George W. Bush administration briefly cooperated with Khamenei in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and in forming a new Afghan government in 2001, the cooperation was short-lived. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, under Khamenei’s directive, Iran armed and supported terrorists and insurgents, killing hundreds of U.S. service members and civilians.⁶⁰ This was part of the regime’s larger strategy to limit ongoing U.S. regional influence and presence.⁶¹ In August 2002, six months after Bush voiced his commitment to denying “terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction,” Iranian opposition groups revealed two significant and previously unknown nuclear sites in Iran.⁶² This alarming revelation injected international concerns about Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts with a newfound sense of urgency.⁶³ 

Following the unnerving nuclear discoveries, Washington maintained pressure on Khamenei and his regime while the Europeans pushed for a diplomatic solution via the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) which produced two agreements that ultimately collapsed.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, despite Khamenei’s reported statements in the early 2000s prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, his regime continued to privately advance toward the acquisition of atomic weapons, including developing warhead designs and production plans.⁶⁵ In response, the Bush administration worked alongside Congress to lay the foundation for tough unilateral sanctions while also acquiring political support for international pressure on Iran. The administration also worked with major allies to implement four binding UN Security Council resolutions (1737, 1747, 1803, 1835) between 2006 and 2008, designed to halt Iranian enrichment and cut off Iran’s access to enrichment technology and arms.⁶⁶ 

When Barack Obama took office, he was intent on re-opening negotiations with Khamenei’s government and reaching a diplomatic solution to Iran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program amid a broader campaign to improve the United States’ relationship with the Muslim world.⁶⁷ He attempted a deal in 2009 that ultimately collapsed and Congress leapt into action, passing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) in 2010.⁶⁸ The resulting sanctions took a heavy toll on the Iranian economy.⁶⁹ Yet, just a few years later, the P5 +1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) reached an interim agreement in 2013 that ultimately resulted in the formal implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran Nuclear Deal, in 2015.⁷⁰ As Iran experts Jonathan Schanzer and Jacob Nagel outline:

In exchange for minimal nuclear concessions, the JPOA [the 2013 interim precursor to the JCPOA] granted Iran — for the first time — a de facto authorization to enrich uranium, contravening multiple Security Council resolutions. This concession directly reneged on the Obama administration’s pledge to Israel. The agreement, designed to last six months, lasted two years as Iran and world powers repeatedly extended talks past self-imposed deadlines. The deal effectively rewarded Tehran with cash every month simply for negotiating. Billions of dollars in sanctions relief injected new life into Iran’s sanctions-battered economy.⁷¹

Leading up to the enactment of the JCPOA, Khamenei stated that he would only accept an agreement that would “meet the interests of the nation, the interests of the country…”⁷² He was likely referencing a pathway to nuclear weapons, which the JCPOA provided, given its sunset provisions that would expire ten to fifteen years after the enactment of the deal.⁷³ The deal also did nothing to limit Iran’s support for terrorism throughout the Middle East or its human rights abuses and freed up billions of dollars for additional malign activities.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Khamenei’s anti-America and anti-Israel rhetoric continued, citing America as the “Great Satan” and the “Zionist orientation” as the “arch enemy of humanity and of morality…”⁷⁵ Reports also revealed that after the ratification of the JCPOA, Iran repeatedly attempted to procure nuclear and ballistic missile raw materials and technology. Meanwhile the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was unable to inspect numerous locations suspected of housing undeclared nuclear activities.⁷⁶ Later, Israel unveiled findings from its seizure of Tehran’s multi-year “Nuclear Archive,” which experts rightly categorize as a violation of the terms of the JCPOA:

The existence and maintenance of an archive related to nuclear weapon design and manufacturing is not compatible with Iran’s legally binding nuclear nonproliferation commitments. It is difficult to see how storing and curating an extensive nuclear weapons archive focused on developing and building missile-deliverable nuclear weapons is consistent with Iran’s pledge under the JCPOA that under no circumstances will it ever seek nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iran failed to provide required design information on facilities it built, dismantled, or had under construction. There are also indications that Iran might have been undertaking activities involving nuclear material and did not report them to the IAEA.⁷⁷

Ultimately, Obama’s diplomatic approach to Khamenei’s nuclear ambitions was at best naïve and at worst irreversibly damaging by allowing Iran sanctions relief without proper enforcement mechanisms to stall or halt nuclear proliferation activities. Donald Trump had a markedly different approach to Khamenei’s nuclear weapons program than his predecessor during his first term. During his 2016 campaign, he repeatedly stated that he opposed the JCPOA, calling it “the worst deal ever negotiated” and pledging to dismantle it if elected.⁷⁸ In 2018, Trump implemented his campaign promise when the United States officially pulled out of the pivotal agreement and worked to reimpose sanctions. The Trump administration cited the agreement’s failure to protect America’s national security interests, stating that “the JCPOA enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior, while at best delaying its ability to pursue nuclear weapons and allowing it to preserve nuclear research and development.”⁷⁹ Ayatollah Khamenei lambasted Trump’s decision and told him that he “made a mistake” while threatening to exit the remaining agreement with the other signatories.⁸⁰ 

As a result of the United States’ exit from the JCPOA and implementation of a “maximum pressure” strategy to target Khamenei’s regime, Iran fell into a massive, multi-year recession where inflation skyrocketed and the value of the rial, Iran’s currency, significantly depreciated.⁸¹ These financial strains limited Khamenei’s ability to fund his terror proxies and wreak havoc across the Middle East, with Hezbollah’s stipend cut in half and Iran’s military spending reduced by ten percent.⁸² Under maximum pressure, Khamenei reaffirmed his commitment to the mantra of “Death to America,” specifically the architects of the crippling sanctions package.⁸³ 

After Joe Biden took office in 2021, Khamenei’s malign activities accelerated. Biden worked tirelessly to return to Obama’s ineffective JCPOA deal while Iran made strides in its nuclear program, enriching enough Uranium for one atomic bomb by 2022.⁸⁴ Amid lax U.S. enforcement, Khamenei was also able to increase Iran’s illicit oil exports to the Chinese Communist Party and evade billions of dollars of sanctions.⁸⁵ Simultaneously, Khamenei continued to funnel money into his terror proxies regionally, culminating in the horrific October 7, 2023, attacks perpetrated by Hamas. A year later, the Supreme Leader reiterated the Axis of Resistance’s commitment to the battle against Israel, claiming that the “resistance will be victorious.”⁸⁶ The Islamic Republic struck Israel twice from Iranian soil in 2024, with Khamenei justifying the October 2024 attacks as “the minimum punishment on that usurping Zionist regime in response to its appalling crimes. It’s a bloodthirsty regime, a wolf-like regime, and the U.S.’s rabid dog in the region.”⁸⁷

Looking Ahead

Even in the wake of Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu’s successful strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, the United States and its allies must not lose sight of Khamenei’s Islamist and anti-Western ideology and track record. Khamenei recently celebrated his 86th birthday and, as he nears the end of his life, he will do everything in his power to ensure the Islamic Republic lives on after he is gone. In many ways, Khamenei has made himself synonymous with the Islamic Republic itself. 

Throughout Khamenei’s reign, the Iranian people have grown increasingly opposed to his oppressive regime. Waves of mass protests against Khamenei and his government’s stranglehold on Iran over the years culminated in the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, which commenced after Iranian national Mahsa Amini was killed in police custody after being beaten and subsequently arrested for failing to comply with Iran’s mandatory hijab law in September 2022. As of April 2025, since Amini’s death, there have been over 8,500 anti-regime protests inside Iran triggered by a variety of grievances related to social, environmental, economic, and other factors.⁸⁸ It is apparent that most Iranians want, and deserve, better than Khamenei’s Islamic Republic. Given that, Washington would be wise to seize Khamenei’s moment of vulnerability as an opportunity to provide maximum support to the people who are risking their lives to protest his regime’s tyrannical grip on all facets of life in Iran.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is an Islamist dictator whose commitment to the spread of political Islam and the safeguarding of the Islamic Republic has remained consistent from his early years as a seminarian into his tenure as Supreme Leader. While the United States may have previously afforded the regime equal footing and even concessions at the negotiating table, this approach has not led to meaningful policy or ideology shifts by Khamenei and his regime. Throughout his reign as Ayatollah, Khamenei’s speeches and actions have demonstrated his undeniable commitment to the destruction of the United States and Israel.⁸⁹ Should the Islamic Republic remain intact until Khamenei’s death, Washington must be prepared to confront Khamenei’s successor when he emerges and take advantage of the Islamic Republic’s vulnerable moment in the absence of its long-serving guardian and a clear raison d’être. Foresight on the part of America and its allies could mean the difference between the successful continuation of the regime after Khamenei’s death and the end of an evil Islamist dictatorship. In the meantime, President Trump must remain iron-clad in his commitment to ensure Tehran cannot possess a nuclear weapon, via a deal or additional strikes if necessary.⁹⁰

Shannon Walsh is deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ National Security Network. She graduated from Tulane University with a bachelor’s degree in Political Science with an international relations concentration. Shannon is an alumna of SSS Iran.

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Image: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the military parade, from khamenei.ir. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAyatollah_Ali_Khamenei_at_the_military_parade.jpg, used under Wikimedia Commons.

[1] “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition),” Trans. Firoozeh Papan-Matin, Iranian Studies 47, no. 1 (2014): 159–200. https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2013.825505. 

[2] Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 7, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf.

[3] Luis Martinez, Anne Flaherty, and Bill Hutchinson, “Bunker Busters, 2 Stealth Bombers Struck Heart of Iran’s Nuclear Program: Sources,” ABC News, June 21, 2025, https://abcnews.go.com/US/bunker-busters-2-stealth-bombers-struck-heart-irans/story?id=123090581.

[4] Mark Dubowitz and Ben Cohen, “U.S. Dealt Iran’s Nukes a Major Blow—But Here’s Why the Cheers May Be Premature,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 22, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/22/us-dealt-irans-nukes-a-major-blow-but-heres-why-the-cheers-may-be-premature/.

[5] “Iran FM: Israel, US Strikes,” CNN, June 22, 2025, video, https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/22/world/video/iran-fm-israel-us-strikes-amanpour-vrtc.

[6] Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Ayatollah Warns Israel That Any Attack Will ‘Not Go Unanswered,’” New York Times, June 21, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html.

[7] “Detailed Biography of Ayatollah Khamenei, Leader of Islamic Revolution,” English Khamenei.ir, September 23, 2013, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/2157/Detailed-biography-of-Ayatollah-Khamenei-Leader-of-Islamic-Revolution.

[8] “Iran Nuclear Talks ‘Positive’ After 15-Month Break,” BBC News, May 23, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17706248.

[9] Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht, Persian Truths and American Self-Deception: Hassan Rouhani, Muhammad-Javad Zarif, and Ali Khamenei in Their Own Words (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 2015), https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/publications/Truths-and-American-Self-Deception.pdf.

[10] Alfoneh and Gerecht, Persian Truths and American Self-Deception, 29. 

[11] Mehdi Khalaji, The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei’s Political Evolution in Iran (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2023), 1.

[12] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 1; Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 4.

[13] United Against Nuclear Iran, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: United Against Nuclear Iran, December 26, 2023), 13, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/Supreme_Leader_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_12-26-23b.pdf.

[14] “Detailed Biography of Ayatollah Khamenei, Leader of Islamic Revolution.”

[15] Alfoneh and Gerecht, Persian Truths and American Self-Deception, 30.

[16] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 38; “Detailed Biography of Ayatollah Khamenei, Leader of Islamic Revolution.

[17] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 27.

[18] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 27.

[19] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 5.

[20] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 5. 

[21] Clyde Haberman, “Cleric Sworn In as Iran’s President Amid Cries of ‘Death to America,’” New York Times, October 14, 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/14/world/cleric-sworn-in-as-iran-s-president-amid-cries-of-death-to-america.html.

[22] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 86.

[23] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 49.

[24] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 49.

[25] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 55-60.

[26] “Detailed Biography of Ayatollah Khamenei, Leader of Islamic Revolution.”

[27] Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, Leader’s Speech at UN General Assembly, September 22, 1987, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/1413/Leader-s-Speech-at-UN-General-Assembly.

[28] Khamenei, Leader’s Speech at UN General Assembly.

[29] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 57.

[30] Edward Cody, “Iran Accepts U.N. Plan for Cease-Fire in War with Iraq,” Washington Post, July 19, 1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/07/19/iran-accepts-un-plan-for-cease-fire-in-war-with-iraq/c9a23ad7-3cc0-46bc-baea-83e29fb7d153/.

[31] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 6; Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 81.

[32] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 6. 

[33] United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 69.

[34] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 66-67.

[35] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 67.

[36] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 120.

[37] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 14.

[38] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 85; United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 71.

[39] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 87; United Against Nuclear Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 74.

[40] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 7. 

[41] Khalaji, The Regent of Allah, 4.

[42] Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, 7.

[43] Kali Robinson and Will Merrow, “Iran’s Regional Armed Network,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-regional-armed-network.

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[45] Iranian Terror Operations on American Soil: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management and the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (2011) (Statement of Matthew Levitt, senior fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), https://www.congress.gov/event/112th-congress/house-event/100177. 

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