Winning the War of Ideas: A U.S. Strategy for the Twenty-First-Century Information Domain

Amidst nearly exclusive focus on the economic, technological, and conventional military domains, American policymakers underappreciate the information domain in the competition between the United States, China, and Russia. As a result, the United States has not adequately responded to the sophistication or scope of information warfare campaigns waged by its adversaries. This paper outlines a framework for addressing this deficiency. 

American adversaries take quite seriously information warfare as a crucial dimension of great power competition. For example, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Document No. 9 discusses at length the “ideological sphere” within China and warns against the threat posed to the Party by “Western values.”¹ Both China and Russia have engaged in sophisticated efforts to control narratives and manipulate the information environment around the world. They wield disinformation and undertake political and cultural interference operations. From China’s United Front work to Russia’s Internet Research Agency activities, to name two examples, both countries weaponize information to manipulate global public perceptions, destabilize democracies, and promote authoritarianism.² 

Beijing has shown itself to be adept at manipulating the information space for strategic gain—whether through election interference in Taiwan via false narratives about Tsai Ing-Wen, Wolf Warrior diplomacy meant to intimidate dissenters, or CCP efforts to obscure the origins of COVID-19. Furthermore, the CCP seeks to exercise what it calls “discourse power” beyond merely controlling narratives and perceptions within China—they seek to shape how the world perceives reality itself.³ A world that accepts authoritarian systems as legitimate—or even superior—enhances the CCP’s domestic legitimacy while advancing its global objectives. 

Meanwhile, Moscow has interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and numerous European elections, and it has conducted ongoing disinformation campaigns during the war in Ukraine.⁴ Russia intentionally strives to sow chaos to destabilize democratic institutions and to breed cynicism and anxiety. By undermining trust in democratic governance, authoritarianism can appear to be a more stable alternative. 

The failure of the United States thus far to deploy a large-scale information warfare strategy or extensive information warfare capabilities has significant consequences. It gives authoritarian regimes the edge in influencing the information space, allowing them to shape global perceptions in ways that advance their strategic objectives. It grants them free reign to erode the moral and strategic foundations of liberal democracy. This is not a theoretical concern. From undermining alliances to eroding trust in democratic institutions and stymieing domestic decision-making, the narratives promoted by China and Russia have a direct impact on America’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Defining Information Warfare

In this article, information warfare should be understood as a protracted form of psychological operations (PSYOPs) conducted as a sustained campaign across the information domain. The U.S. military defines psychological operations as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.”⁵

Building on that definition, this paper treats information warfare as a sustained strategic campaign involving multiple, ongoing psychological operations targeted at foreign populations—specifically those within the borders of the United States’ great power adversaries, China and Russia—to influence their beliefs, emotions, and ultimately their behavior in ways that serve U.S. interests. Whereas traditional PSYOPs are discrete operations with a specific message or objective, information warfare represents a broader, dynamic initiative.

The United States has successfully engaged in this type of activity before. During the Cold War, the United States operated the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), created under President Dwight Eisenhower with the mission to “understand, inform and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest.”⁶ The former Director of USIA’s Film and TV Service, Alvin Snyder, gave a sense of the agency’s scale in his 1995 memoir when he explained:

The U.S. government ran a full-service public relations organization, the largest in the world….Its full-time professional staff of more than 10,000, spread out among some 150 countries, burnished America’s image and trashed the Soviet Union 2,500 hours a week with a ‘tower of babble’ comprised of more than 70 languages, to the tune of over $2 billion per year.⁷

As a more contemporary example of American attempts to strategically influence foreign publics, from 2020 to 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense conducted a covert anti-vaccination propaganda campaign, called the #ChinaAngVirus campaign, to dissuade populations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East from trusting Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccines. Employing over 300 fake social media accounts, the campaign was designed to counter China’s growing influence and COVID diplomacy efforts in those regions.⁸

The Problem

While the #ChinaAngVirus campaign exemplifies encouraging progress, the United States has not yet launched an effective response to Chinese and Russian advancements in the information domain at the scale or level of sophistication required. Instead, the recent American approach remains tethered to legacy organizations from a bygone era. These include news outlets—created during the Cold War and administered as part of the U.S. Information Agency—which aim only to provide objective, truthful information, allowing target audiences to draw their own conclusions. They are not normative; they do not seek to actively promote messages, narratives, or a worldview aligned with American interests and values. These organizations’ minimalist approach to the information space is glaringly insufficient in the face of rapidly evolving technologies and the aggressive tactics employed by authoritarian adversaries. The incongruity between the challenges the United States faces and the tools it deploys is a critical vulnerability.

Until early 2025, the United States’ public information efforts were governed and funded by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversaw laudable organizations like Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA). These outlets were critical to countering Soviet propaganda during the Cold War, broadcasting objective news and credible reporting into closed societies. This mission assumed that the dissemination of accurate information, free from bias or distortion, would naturally expose the lies of authoritarian regimes and foster indigenous efforts among their populations to advocate for their own freedom.

However, the media landscape in which these organizations operate has dramatically changed since their inception. Broadcasting, which was cutting-edge technology in the mid-twentieth century, has been supplanted by the internet, social media, and on-demand digital content as the dominant modes of communication and entertainment. Even their names—still centered on radio—highlight their struggle to adapt. And while they have expanded their digital reach, they fundamentally remain news organizations. 

These organizations are also constrained by their mandate to provide “objective news.”⁹ For example, VOA’s mission is to be “a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news,”¹⁰ while RFE/RL seeks to “promote democratic values by providing accurate, uncensored news and open debate.”¹¹ While these principles are admirable, they fall short of addressing the broader strategic challenges posed by authoritarian regimes’ highly targeted and manipulative information campaigns. 

Simply providing facts, no matter how accurate, is an insufficient response to adversaries who actively shape narratives, distort realities, and exploit emotional appeals to advance their agendas. Therefore, the way the United States has traditionally approached information warfare reflects an inaccurate understanding of how influence today is wielded; it assumes that truth, when presented clearly and credibly, will naturally prevail. This idealistic view overlooks the psychological and sociological dimensions of how people consume and process information in the internet age. Today, narratives often trump facts, and emotional resonance can be more persuasive than empirical accuracy, as evidenced by rising dissemination of conspiracy theories online. 

Adversaries like Russia and China understand this dynamic and exploit it ruthlessly. Russia’s disinformation campaigns are designed not to convince but to confuse. By flooding the information space with contradictory narratives, Russia erodes trust in objective reality itself. This strategy, referred to as a “firehose of falsehood,” makes it difficult for audiences to discern truth from falsehood, fostering cynicism and disengagement.¹² China, on the other hand, employs a more calculated approach. Through its emphasis on “discourse power,” the CCP seeks to establish narratives that normalize authoritarian governance and discredit democratic systems.¹³ Whether through Wolf Warrior diplomacy, the manipulation of Hollywood, or the funding of Confucius Institutes, China systematically advances a worldview that legitimizes its regime while undermining liberal democratic values.¹⁴

The historical U.S. approach, which relies heavily on presenting objective information without an overarching narrative or strategic intent, fails to counter these sophisticated strategies. It is not enough to simply report facts and hope that audiences will draw the right conclusions. Effective information warfare requires the promotion of compelling narratives that resonate emotionally, culturally, and politically with target audiences.

The rapid evolution of technology has fundamentally transformed the information environment, creating new challenges for U.S. information efforts. Social platforms like Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, WeChat, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become the primary sources of information for many people worldwide, particularly younger audiences.¹⁵ These platforms are dominated by user-generated content, short-form videos, and algorithm-driven recommendations that prioritize engagement over accuracy. Traditional broadcast media, even in its digital form, struggles to compete with the immediacy, personalization, and virality of these new formats.

The types of content that resonate most with modern audiences are often far removed from the sober, factual reporting offered by VOA and RFE/RL. Humorous memes, short-form videos, lengthy podcast episodes, and lifestyle content like vlogs and Pinterest boards are media formats that have captured audiences’ attention on the internet. These formats are not merely entertainment; they are powerful vehicles for shaping perceptions and spreading ideas. For example, some speculate that TikTok has been a major amplifier of pro-Palestine sentiment among younger Americans.¹⁶ A U.S. information warfare strategy must embrace these mediums, embedding political messages into seemingly apolitical content to reach broader audiences, rather than clinging to traditional models of news dissemination that fail to capture the attention of modern consumers.

The lack of a coherent, strategic narrative undermines the United States’ ability to project its values and interests abroad. Without a compelling counter-narrative to authoritarian propaganda, the ideals of liberal democracy—freedom, rule of law, and human dignity—are at risk of being overshadowed by the false promises of authoritarian stability and order.

Additionally, cultural relevance is another crucial aspect of successful information efforts. Russia tailors its disinformation campaigns to exploit the unique vulnerabilities of each target country, such as racial tensions in the United States or nationalist sentiments in Europe.¹⁷ By contrast, the U.S. toolkit lacks this cultural understanding at scale or in a way that can be strategically utilized. 

The United States must confront these shortcomings head-on by developing a new strategy implemented by an altogether new toolkit.

Defining the U.S. Narrative

A central aim of a U.S. information warfare strategy should be the proliferation of liberal democracy around the world—especially within America’s foremost adversaries. Though undeniably ambitious, this objective focuses on nurturing a cultural resonance and popular desire for liberal democracy within rival societies. These efforts can prime populations for the possibility of swift governmental transformations if opportunities arise. They may even spur those transformations. Alternatively, these initiatives may compel authoritarian governments to yield significant concessions, setting the stage for a gradual evolution toward more open and democratic systems.

A world where liberal values are widespread is a world that is inherently safer for the United States. Democracies do not wage wars against one another, and the spread of democratic governance diminishes the influence of authoritarian regimes.¹⁸ Conversely, a world where authoritarianism is perceived as legitimate not only undermines global stability but directly threatens American interests. To neglect this space is to cede a critical battleground. The best defense is a good offense. By engaging offensively in the information domain, the United States can shape perceptions, inspire hope, and counteract the corrosive narratives advanced by its adversaries.

Beyond this long-term vision, information warfare can play a vital role in a broader competitive strategy against authoritarian adversaries for as long as their current governments remain in power. A U.S. information warfare strategy would force adversarial governments to divert finite resources toward protecting their grip on power domestically—primarily through extensive censorship measures and elaborate propaganda campaigns—instead of pursuing initiatives that directly threaten U.S. interests. By taking the offensive in the information domain, the United States can compel countries like China and Russia to allocate even more of their resources to self-preservation. This defensive reallocation would likely weaken their capacity to spread disinformation within democratic societies, thereby further enhancing overall American national security.

America’s foremost adversaries are totalitarian in nature—driven by the desire to control truth itself. For these regimes, a singular, state-sanctioned perspective leaves no room for dissenting ideas. Emulating their tactics, it could be argued, risks compromising the very principles that define liberal democracies. However, the pluralistic nature of the United States embraces a spectrum of views while still being anchored in a fundamental liberal worldview. Much like writer C.S. Lewis’s concept of “mere Christianity” that transcended theological divides, the United States can champion a mere Americanism rooted in enduring values—freedom of expression and assembly, economic liberty, and the rule of law, to name a few—that resonate universally rather than being confined to partisan or culturally specific agendas.¹⁹ Importantly, this strategy would not advance ideologies associated with unresolved domestic controversies or culture war issues, but instead affirm the foundational civic principles to which Americans of all political stripes generally subscribe.

In effect, this strategy would aim to promote the “procedural minimalism” framework that political scientist Robert Dahl used to define democracy, which he claimed included free, fair, and competitive elections; full adult suffrage; broad protection of civil liberties; and the absence of nonelected tutelary authorities.²⁰ Notably, this definition includes both democratic institutional processes as well as classical liberalism, whereby the democratic processes exist to protect and uphold individuals’ dignity, rights, and freedoms. 

A U.S. information warfare strategy along these lines resonates with longstanding American principles. It would not only counter authoritarian propaganda but also actively empower people around the world by ensuring that diverse viewpoints may be voiced in the public square. Promoting liberal values abroad reinforces the same democratic responsiveness and intellectual open-mindedness that many populists demand at home.

Proposed Solution

To reclaim the initiative in the information domain, the United States needs a bold information warfare strategy that leverages emerging technologies, reflects the realities of modern communication, and advances a vision of freedom and democracy. This strategy must move beyond the passive models of the past, embracing creativity and strategic intent. Three core features should define this approach: the use of cutting-edge technologies to penetrate closed societies; the adoption of modern communication methods tailored to contemporary audiences; and the crafting of targeted, strategically purposeful messages.

Circumventing Authoritarian Controls

One of the defining challenges of the information domain today is the sophisticated control authoritarian regimes exert over their domestic information spaces. China’s Great Firewall, Russia’s Roskomnadzor, and other censorship mechanisms enable these regimes to limit their populations’ exposure to dissenting ideas and alternative narratives. To counter this, the United States must prioritize technologies that bypass these barriers and ensure that content reaches its intended audiences.

A cornerstone of this effort should be the deployment of systems like Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet service, which has already demonstrated its potential in Ukraine by providing connectivity in conflict zones.²¹ Starlink and similar satellite-based systems can provide uncensored internet access to populations in authoritarian countries, circumventing government firewalls and state-controlled networks. By ensuring access to the global information ecosystem, these technologies lay the groundwork for broader information campaigns.

In addition to satellite internet, virtual private networks (VPNs) and other encryption tools should be distributed to empower individuals within closed societies to access and share restricted content. Peer-to-peer technologies—such as Apple’s AirDrop—offer another easier, more rapid method of doing this, functioning much like the distribution of flash drives loaded with subversive content in North Korea.²² The United States should work with private sector partners to make these tools widely available and user-friendly, while also investing in research to stay ahead of authoritarian countermeasures and ensuring these tools remain effective in the face of ever-increasingly sophisticated detection and blocking efforts.

Furthermore, the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) represents a powerful opportunity to create culturally tailored content at scale. AI tools can analyze the linguistic, cultural, and emotional nuances of target audiences, enabling the production of messages that resonate on a deeply personal level. This technology should be integrated into the broader strategy, not as a substitute for human oversight, but as a force multiplier that enhances the volume and relevance of U.S. messaging efforts.

These technologies are best understood as restorative or enabling tools that help level the playing field rather than functioning as either offensive or defense. Used in the ways described here, they defend against authoritarian censorship by providing access to uncensored information.

Engaging Contemporary Audiences

To succeed in the information domain, the United States must leverage the platforms, formats, and communication styles commonplace in today’s media. Unlike the broadcast model of the twentieth century, today’s information environment is dominated by short-form, user-generated, and visually engaging content. Social media platforms, like WeChat in China and VKontakte in Russia, have become central to how people consume information.²³ An effective strategy must meet people where they are, using these mediums to deliver messages that are compelling, shareable, and relevant.

One promising avenue is the production of short, viral videos that encapsulate key messages in an accessible and entertaining format. These videos could range from satirical content mocking authoritarian regimes to educational clips highlighting the benefits of liberal democratic governance. Humor—a tactic successfully employed by the Otpor movement that overthrew Serbia’s dictator—is a powerful tool for undermining authoritarian legitimacy, as it exposes the absurdities and contradictions of their systems in a way that resonates emotionally with audiences.²⁴

In addition to short-form videos, podcasts, and long-form storytelling formats can be used to engage more reflective and curious audiences. As an example of an explicit critique, a podcast series could feature interviews with individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes, sharing their personal stories of oppression and their aspirations for freedom. More implicit messages could be offered by food vlogs, travel content, and other lifestyle programming. These types of content can subtly incorporate messages about the freedoms and opportunities available in democratic societies, appealing to audiences through relatable and non-threatening sources. There exists a plethora of innovative ways to embed political messages into seemingly apolitical content. For example, a tutorial about starting a small business could highlight the absence of red tape in some liberal democracies compared to the corruption and cronyism often found in autocracies.

Crafting Targeted Messages with Strategic Intent

At the heart of this information warfare strategy is the need for targeted, strategically purposeful messages. One focus should be exposing the failures and hypocrisies of authoritarian regimes. For example, stories of corruption, environmental degradation, economic mismanagement, or human rights abuses can be highlighted to erode confidence in these systems. Exposure of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s corruption contributed to the 2014 Maidan protests, and Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption investigations in Russia also sparked mass protests.²⁵ Popular discontent resulting from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing’s publication of air quality statistics led to the Chinese government investing billions into pollution reduction.²⁶ Messages on these topics would not be delivered as dry reports but as emotionally engaging narratives that resonate with the lived experiences of target audiences. For example, a short documentary on the environmental costs of Chinese industrial policies, paired with personal stories of those affected, could have a powerful effect.

Another critical theme is highlighting the benefits and successes of liberal democracies. Content should showcase the freedoms, opportunities, and prosperity that democratic governance enables. This could include testimonials from individuals who have flourished in free societies, comparisons of quality-of-life metrics between democracies and authoritarian states, or aspirational portrayals of democratic values in action. This content would also generate admiration for the United States and sympathy for American interests among foreign populations. It would hope to entice desire for liberal democracy while fostering skepticism of authoritarian propaganda.

In addition to countering authoritarian propaganda, this strategy must also offer a positive vision of the future. Merely critiquing autocracies could result in cynicism, complacency, and nihilism. Instead, the United States must articulate a compelling alternative that inspires hope and aspiration. This vision should emphasize universal principles such as freedom of expression, rule of law, economic freedom, and anti-corruption, framing them as foundational to human dignity.

It is this strategic narrative-shaping effort that constitutes the offensive component of this information warfare strategy, as it involves actively promoting liberal democratic ideals, exposing the corruption and repression of adversary governments, and inspiring foreign populations to question the legitimacy of those governments.

 A Harmonious Strategy

The three core features of this strategy—leveraging technologies, adopting modern communication methods, and crafting targeted messages—are not standalone initiatives but interconnected components of a cohesive approach. For example, the use of Starlink or VPNs to bypass censorship would enable the delivery of short, engaging videos—or any other form of subversive content—tailored to specific audiences. Similarly, partnerships with online influencers can amplify the reach of the strategically crafted messages in these videos and other digital media. 

Integrating elements of this strategy is critical to maximizing the impact of the strategy. By integrating cutting-edge technologies with innovative communication methods and strategic narratives, the United States would implement optimally effective information campaigns. This comprehensive approach ensures that the strategy is not only reactive to the tactics of authoritarian regimes but also proactive in shaping the global information environment.

Implementation

While the appropriate contours of an information warfare strategy are critical, success depends on execution. The first step in implementing this strategy is establishing a new organization specifically tasked with information warfare, inspired by the former U.S. Information Agency. This entity must operate independently of USAGM, whose mission of providing objective, unbiased news remains vital but fundamentally distinct. Merging these functions would undermine the integrity, independence, and credibility of USAGM’s outlets which already face accusations of being propaganda arms. By creating a new, separate entity, the United States can avoid giving credence to these claims while ensuring a sharper focus on the strategic goals of information warfare.

Structural Design

The new entity could be established as an independent agency devoted solely to information warfare. This agency would leverage the unique strengths currently dispersed among the intelligence community, the Department of State, and the private sector. It would draw on the intelligence community’s expertise in adversarial information operations and its capacity for covert initiatives—such as deploying Starlink base stations and satellites and expanding VPN infrastructures—while also employing the public diplomacy understanding of the Department of State and the innovative technological prowess of private industry. Centralizing these capabilities under a unified leadership in a single independent agency would enable clear, decisive messaging and prevent the internal conflicts that often hinder interagency efforts.

Given the inherently sensitive nature of information warfare, a bipartisan board of trustees should oversee its activities, minimizing the risk of political misuse and ensuring that the agency remains focused on promoting universal values like freedom of expression, rule of law, and anti-corruption rather than wading into domestically divisive social or cultural issues.

Cultural Relevance and Expertise

This information warfare strategy would require a deep understanding of the cultural, historical, and social context of the targeted societies. Merely bombarding foreign audiences with pro-American rhetoric would be ineffective and could backfire. To ensure that its messaging resonates with diverse audiences, the new entity must incorporate cultural expertise into its operations. Advisory boards composed of academics, diaspora communities, and other regional experts should be established for each target country or region. These boards would provide critical insights into the values, grievances, and aspirations of local populations, helping to craft narratives that are both authentic and effective.

Dissidents and members of diaspora communities could also serve as content creators. These individuals often possess a deeper understanding of their home cultures and may be better positioned to communicate authentically with those audiences. Furthermore, residing outside of authoritarian regimes insulates them from direct repression, allowing them to speak more freely than those within the target countries.

Cutting-Edge Technologies

A key aspect of the implementation strategy is the integration of cutting-edge technologies to enhance the entity’s reach and effectiveness. As mentioned, tools like Starlink, VPNs, and generative AI will play a central role in bypassing authoritarian censorship and delivering content to closed societies. However, effective implementation requires more than just acquiring these technologies—it demands a coordinated effort to deploy them strategically and sustainably.

This should include collaboration with private sector partners, especially in the technology sector. For instance, partnerships with satellite internet providers like SpaceX could facilitate the rapid deployment of Starlink in areas where authoritarian regimes restrict internet access. Assistance from cybersecurity firms could enhance the resilience of VPNs and other anti-censorship tools, ensuring their continued effectiveness against adversarial countermeasures.

Generative AI should be used to produce culturally nuanced content at scale, enabling the entity to respond quickly to emerging opportunities or challenges. AI tools could generate localized memes, videos, and other digital content tailored to the linguistic and cultural nuances of target audiences. While human oversight remains essential for ethical reasons and for ensuring strategic alignment, AI offers a powerful means of amplifying these efforts.

Creative Content Production

This new agency must produce content that resonates with audiences across a variety of platforms and formats. To achieve this, it should establish a dedicated creative team composed of digital strategists, content creators, and social media experts. This team would be tasked with experimenting with new formats, testing audience engagement, and iterating rapidly based on feedback and analytics. This approach mirrors the private sector’s methods in social media marketing and content creation, where companies rely on marketers and creative teams to analyze audience behavior, test innovative strategies, and refine their messaging to maximize engagement and impact.

Content should be designed to align with the consumption habits of target audiences, leveraging the platforms that are most popular with the target audience in order to maximize reach and engagement. The agency could also partner with influencers and creators who already have established followings within the target regions. These partnerships can amplify the reach of U.S. messaging while lending it credibility and authenticity. 

Conclusion

In the current great power competition, the information domain constitutes a critical battlefield. The United States must do more than defend itself against the disinformation and propaganda of adversaries like China and Russia; it must lead with a proactive strategy that inspires hope, promotes freedom, and exposes the moral and practical failings of authoritarian governance.

Armed with new technologies that would enhance these efforts, American policymakers can be emboldened by remembering that the United States has engaged in information warfare before—and with incredible success. U.S. information campaigns played a crucial role in undermining Soviet communism during the Cold War. At that time, the United States understood that merely being morally right or having the best ideas was not enough; those ideas had to be actively promoted. President Ronald Reagan poetically articulated this in his June 1982 address to the British Parliament at Westminster. He explained, “No, democracy is not a fragile flower; still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.”²⁷ 

During the Reagan administration, the U.S. Information Agency, under the leadership of Charles Wick, broadcast pro-America messages which invaluably complemented U.S. covert efforts to support dissident movements like Solidarity in Poland. By engaging in the ideological struggle, the United States did not merely defend itself: it shaped the international system in a way that favored its political and economic system. As in the Cold War, the cultivation of democracy and freedom today demands deliberate effort and strategic vision to ensure they flourish amid authoritarian challenges.

The information warfare strategy proposed here is rooted in this outlook. By leveraging modern technologies, adopting innovative communication methods, and crafting compelling narratives, the United States can reclaim its position as the leading force for freedom and democracy. This strategy does not seek to deceive or coerce but to reveal—in a persuasive way—the truth of what liberal democracy offers and the lies upon which authoritarian regimes are built. It is about empowering individuals with knowledge, inspiration, and the tools to challenge oppression in their own societies.

The creation of a dedicated entity for information warfare that is technologically advanced and culturally attuned represents more than a tactical adjustment—it is a strategic investment in the future of U.S. influence and global leadership. This effort is not just about countering authoritarian propaganda; it is about championing a vision of freedom and democracy that inspires hope and resilience in the face of oppression.

To neglect the information domain would be to cede the battleground to America’s adversaries, allowing them to shape perceptions among international audiences, erode the foundations of democracy both in the United States and around the world, and define the moral and political imagination of billions. But, with bold action, the United States can chart a path forward that not only strengthens its own security but also lights the way for those who yearn to be free. As President Reagan reminded us, “While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings.”²⁸ The future of freedom around the world depends on those willing to advance it today; the United States must stand up and lead.

Thomas Kenna is the Associate Director of Policy at the Ronald Reagan Institute. He graduated from American University with a bachelor’s degrees in International Studies and Business Administration. Thomas is an alumnus of SSS China, Russia, and Iran. 

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Image: Looking up one of the assembly lines at Ford’s big Willow Run plant, where B-24E (Liberator) bombers are being made… – NARA – 196389, February 1943, from U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Looking_up_one_of_the_assembly_lines_at_Ford%27s_big_Willow_Run_plant,_where_B-24E_(Liberator)_bombers_are_being_made…_-_NARA_-_196389.jpg, used under Wikimedia Commons.

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[23] Statista, “Top Active Social Media Platforms in Russia,” January 3, 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/867549/top-active-social-media-platforms-in-russia/.

[24]Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “To Defy a Dictator, Send in the Clowns,” Berggruen Institute, May 22, 2024, https://berggruen.org/news/to-defy-a-dictator-send-in-the-clowns.

[25] Anton Troianovski, Andrew E. Kramer, and Andrew Higgins, “Navalny Protests in Russia,” The New York Times, January 23, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/world/europe/navalny-protests-russia.html.

[26] David Roberts, “Opinion: The U.S. Embassy in Beijing Tweeted Clear Air,” Wired, March 6, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/03/opinion-us-embassy-beijing-tweeted-clear-air/.

[27] Ronald Reagan, “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, June 8, 1982, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-members-british-parliament.

[28] Reagan, “Address to Members of British Parliament.”